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Decentralization, the transfer of authorities from the central government to local 
governments, tends to impact the performance of local authorities. These impacts are felt 
through changes in the allocation of revenue patterns, improvements to the quality of, and 
access to, public services, and relocation of decision-making to a local level. The ongoing 
decentralization reform in Ukraine simultaneously features administrative, fiscal and political 
decentralization of power. It is expected that the reform will facilitate community development 
and improve quality of life by empowering the lowest levels of government. This study 
analyzes changes in the quality of public services in the cities of regional significance in 
Ukraine since the beginning of the decentralization reform in 2014. Using the data from the 
Ukrainian Municipal Survey 2015-2018, we compared the quality of public services rated by 
the residents of the 24 cities in 2015 and 2018. We found that the overall quality of public 
services improved within the measured period with only the quality of medical institutions 
showing a slight decrease. The largest improvements were observed in the quality of road 
infrastructure and public parks. We attribute these improvements to increased government 
transparency and accountability, as well as local governments’ ability to address local issues. 
Increased revenues and reductions in corruption also contributed to the improvement in the 
quality of public services. However, regardless of the improved average quality, some cities 
show significant decreases in some, or most, of the services. Among the 24 surveyed cities, 18 
improved the average quality of public services. The citizens of the remaining six cities rated 
the quality as decreased. The estimated decreases vary from 0.9% in Ternopil to 9.1% in 
Chernivtsi. Based on the inconsistency in the change of the quality of public services, we 
recommend a process for monitoring of actions, expenditures, and budgets at local levels of 
vii 
government, linked with their actions for improving the quality of local services. Secondly, 
local governments should facilitate actions that address the current low level of public 
participation and engagement in local decision-making. Additionally, shifting the responsibility 
of providing public services from local governments to private companies and implementation 
of public-private partnerships will ensure more consumer oriented services, and therefore, 
higher quality of services due to market competition. Lastly, we call for well-trained officials 
to support comprehensive planning and economic development planning efforts in local 
governments. 
1 
CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
Reforms that restructure local government systems have been widely introduced 
throughout the 20th century (Hanes & Wikström, 2010). There are multiple reasons for a 
decentralization reform to be implemented. Some examples include the introduction of multi-
party political systems in African states, pursuing advances in democracy in Latin America, 
and supporting the transition to a market economy through the process of privatization in 
Eastern Europe (Kwon, 2012; Oates, 1999). In general, the implementation of 
decentralization policies by central governments tends to impact the performance of local 
governments, change the allocation of revenue patterns, improve quality and access to public 
services for communities’ needs, and brings decision-making to a local level, enhancing the 
democracy of a state (Faguet, 2004; Kwon, 2012).  
The objective of this study is to assess the effects of government decentralization on 
the quality of public services in major cities in Ukraine, where the decentralization reform 
has been under the implementation since 2014. Given the inconsistency of empirical results 
in previous studies on the quality of public services in decentralized municipalities, this study 
focused on whether the restructuring of Ukraine’s government - administrative, fiscal and 
political decentralization occurring simultaneously – have led to improvements in the quality 
of public services. Additionally, we explored whether decentralized governments tend to 
focus more on improving public services that produce immediate observable improvements, 
such as road infrastructure and public parks and gardens. 
According to the literature surrounding this topic, government decentralization tends 
to improve the provision of local public services by bringing the government closer to 
people. Administratively and politically decentralized local governments become more 
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receptive to local needs due to a reduction in the distance between the citizens and the 
government (Faguet, 2014; Wallis & Oates, 1988). The reduced distance also positively 
impacts the ability of local governments to implement policies according to the needs of 
diverse populations and the preferences of minority groups. Thus, a decentralized system 
provides more flexibility in accommodating the desires of a heterogeneous population 
(Brancati, 2006). Additionally, in order to satisfy local constituencies, recently decentralized 
governments tend to focus on policies that produce visible results in short terms, and that are 
easy and cheap to implement (Berney, 2011; Cordeiro Guerra & Lastra-Anadón, 2019). 
Fiscal decentralization introduces new responsibilities for the local governments in the 
allocation of budget funds which increases their financial abilities (Slack & Bird, 2013). 
However, fiscal decentralization tends to increase government expenditures and, in cases of 
high fragmentation and small size of government bodies, leads to a loss of "economies of 
scale" and a rise in the costs of administration (Oates, 1985). Also, regardless of the new 
ability to collect revenues on a local level, some local governments remain dependent upon 
transfers from the central government, what might negatively influence the effectiveness of 
local governments (Oates, 1999).  
Studies show inconsistent results for the effects of decentralization on public services. 
While some studies report improvements in quality and access to public services (Cavalieri 
& Ferrante, 2016; Chen, Huang, & Li, 2017; Faguet & Sánchez, 2014; Freinkman, 2010; 
Galiani, Gertler, & Schargrodsky, 2008; Jiménez-Rubio, 2011; Kudamatsu, 2012), others 
find no effect or negative results in the provision of public services after the implementation 
of decentralization reforms (Akin, Hutchinson, & Strumpf, 2005; Alesina, Baqir, & 
Easterley, 1999; Antón, Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernández Macías, & Rivera, 2014; Besley & 
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Coate, 2003; Reingewertz, 2012; Sanogo, 2019). Some studies find mixed results and support 
that the success of decentralization policies depends on a country’s level of income, size of 
communities, or its ethnic diversity (Cordeiro Guerra & Lastra-Anadón, 2019; Cuadrado-
Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, & Prado-Lorenzo, 2012; Khaleghian, 2004; Slack & Bird, 
2013). Most work in this area has concentrated on explaining changes in the quality of 
education, medical institutions, and less in the quality of utilities, public services, and public 
spaces. In this study, we cover changes in the quality of utilities, road infrastructure, public 
transportation, sport facilities, cultural venues, and public parks and gardens, in addition to 
medical institutions and education. 
To achieve our objectives, we use the decentralization reform in Ukraine as a case 
study. This setting is unique for studying decentralization reforms because of its overlap with 
a period of military conflict. For the analysis, the data on the quality of the local services for 
24 major Ukrainian cities is collected from the Ukrainian Municipal Survey for years 2015, 
2016, 2017 and 2018. We use descriptive statistics and regression models to analyze the data. 
We compare the change in the quality of services between the years 2015 and 2018 to see 
which public services improved the most in their quality and in which cities. We use a 
multiple regression model with a lagged explanatory variable to incorporate the feedback of 
the scores over time and test for significance in the rest of the explanatory variables in the 
model. A multiple linear regression model is used to determine a relationship between the 
change in the quality of the public services and demographic, economic, and political 
proxies. The analysis allows us to evaluate the reform’s current progress and produce 
recommendations for the future of the decentralization reform in Ukraine.  
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This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the definitions and types 
of decentralization, as well as the impacts of the decentralization reforms on the work of 
local governments and the quality of public services. Chapter 3 outlines the decentralization 
reform in Ukraine. Chapter 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis and discusses 
findings. Chapter 5 provides the conclusion and highlights for recommendations regarding 




CHAPTER 2.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
Definitions, types, and forms of decentralization 
There is a wide range of possible reasons for a central government to implement 
decentralization policies. For example, decentralization policies have been used to introduce 
multi-party political systems in African states, to pursue advances in democracy in Latin 
America, and to aid in transitioning to a market economy through the process of privatization in 
Eastern Europe (Kwon, 2012; Oates, 1999). Regardless of the reasons for implementation, 
decentralization policies tend to impact the performance of local governments, change the 
allocation of revenue patterns, improve quality and access to public services for communities’ 
needs, and bring decision-making to a local level, enhancing the democracy of a state (Faguet, 
2004; Kwon, 2012). 
Researches recognize three types of decentralization; administrative, political, and fiscal 
decentralization (Siddle & Koelble, 2012). The first type of decentralization, administrative 
decentralization, is a process of redistributing power from a central authority to local 
governments, and refers to a “set of policies that transfer the administration and delivery of 
social services, such as education, health, social welfare, or housing to sub-national 
governments” (Siddle & Koelble, 2012, p. 20) and delegates decision-making to a local level 
(Yusoff, Sarjoon, & Hassan, 2016). Manor (1999, p. 5) describes it as “the dispersal of agents of 
higher levels of government into lower level arenas.” Administrative decentralization can be 
measured as an actual level of authority, power, and decision-making in the hands of local 
governments (Goel, Mazhar, Nelson, & Ram, 2017). 
Administrative decentralization brings a range of positive changes. Firstly, the level of 
public participation is expected to grow because of administrative decentralization. This can be 
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attributed to a reduced distance between a local government and the population compared to the 
same for the central government. Secondly, the well-being of the general population and 
perceptions of local governments tend to enhance the following implementation of fiscal and 
political decentralization. The fact that decentralized governance decision-making and policy 
implementations occur at the local level is important for the citizens' satisfaction (Diaz-Serrano 
& Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). Decentralized local governments are, also, more transparent and 
available to the local population. Increasing community engagement through public 
contributions to local decision making is essential for successful community development and 
the understanding of local needs and issues. As Mewes (2011, p. 40) states, the positive effects 
of decentralization in promoting economic development and economic efficiency require the 
participation of both, a local government and the population.  
The effects and characteristics of administrative decentralization usually differ based on 
how a state government is organized, whether the decentralization occurs in a federal or unitary 
state. In their study, based on World Enterprise Surveys of individual business owners and 
managers, Goel et al. (2017) found that, in relation to administrative decentralization, unitary 
governments perform better than federal in areas of tax administration, business licensing, and 
levels of corruption. Regardless of whether the state is unitary or not, several requirements 
should be met in order for administrative decentralization to be successful (Bilouseac, 2015). 
These requirements include a) the existence of local governments that function at the lowest 
administrative unit level, b) the maintenance and provision of local services by the local 
administrations, c) the presence of financial resources that are adequate to cover the expenditures 
of the local government administration and the provision of services to the population, d) the 
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election of local officials by local constituencies, and e) supremacy of the national government 
over the laws of local authorities, or what Bilouseac calls “guardianship control”.  
 
Figure 1: De-concentration, delegation and devolution distinctions  
Source: Wahiu, Hedling, & Böckenförde, 2011, p. 19. 
 
 
On its own administrative decentralization can take three forms: devolution, delegation, 
and de-concentration (Figure 1). Devolution, recognized as the strongest form of 
decentralization, creates a complete transfer of authority, decision-making processes, and 
finances from the central government to lower tiers “through an electoral process which makes 
local governance units directly accountable to local people” (Yusoff et al., 2016, p. 58). 
Delegation features the transfer of power from central to local governments or semi-
autonomous organizations that are accountable to the central government. Some examples of 
such organizations can be boards, corporations, semi-autonomous school districts, or any 
agencies that are responsible for specific functions (Yusoff et al., 2016). The principal-agent 
relationship is created within the delegation form of decentralization where “the central 




20). This form of administrative decentralization provides less freedom of decision-making than 
devolution. 
De-concentration features a shift of responsibilities of policy implementation from the 
central government to local bodies while decision-making authority remains at the center. De-
concentration as a form of administrative decentralization is more common for unitary states 
(Yusoff et al., 2016). Manor (1999) describes de-concentration as a form of decentralization that 
occurs without simultaneous democratization and can be defined as when:  
agents of higher levels of government move into lower level arenas but remain 
accountable only to persons higher up in the system-it enables central authority to 
penetrate more effectively into those arenas without increasing the influence of 
organized interests at those levels. The central government is not giving up any 
authority. It is simply relocating its officers at different levels or points in the national 
territory. In such circumstances, it tends in practice to constitute centralization, since it 
enhances the leverage of those at the apex of the system (Manor, 1999, p. 5). 
This form of decentralization does not, in fact, create a tier government system and therefore, 
does not transfer authority to lower levels of government as in delegation or devolution processes 
(Wahiu et al., 2011). 
Political decentralization refers to the dispersal of political authority and/or electoral 
capacities from a central government to lower level actors (Siddle & Koelble, 2012, p. 21). 
Manor (1999, p. 5), leaving space for interpretation, defines it as a “transfer of resources and 
power (and often, tasks) to lower level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of 
higher levels of government, and which are democratic in some way and to some degree”. 
According to Barnett, Minis, & VanSant (1997), the development of mutual relations between 
national and local governments and between local authorities and citizens refers to political 
decentralization. It represents the power of local authorities to develop and implement electoral 
policies, spread democratic processes to lower government levels, and ensure the sustainability 
of democracy. Political decentralization empowers citizens to elect local-level officials and 
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representatives of the local government. In other words, political decentralization represents the 
degree to which lower levels of government can perform political functions (Wahiu et al., 2011).  
Finally, fiscal decentralization is defined by Manor (1999) as a transfer of influence, 
financial decision rights, and fiscal authority from higher levels of government to lower levels. 
Fiscal decentralization is generally measured as “the size of local tax revenues and expenditures 
relative to the national tax revenues and expenditures, i.e. it is a measure of how much decision 
making is decentralized to the local governments” (Hanes & Wikström, 2010, p. 60). Although 
some studies share the view that fiscal decentralization is not a separate type of decentralization 
but an element that takes place on the cross section of both political and administrative 
decentralization (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008), financial autonomy of local authorities assures 
the ability of local governments to perform their assigned tasks without weakening or making 
decentralization ineffective (Yusoff et al., 2016).  
The creation of a healthy and balanced fiscally decentralized vertical system is an 
important but complex and complicated task in developing countries. As Oates (1999) mentions, 
in developing countries, local governments usually have restricted access to the tax and revenues 
from their localities and often heavily rely on financial transfers from high-level or central 
governments. This dependency on allocations from above may result in a switch from satisfying 
local needs and making accountable financial decisions on the local level to favoring the wishes 
of central authorities. For the successful creation of effective local revenue systems, Oates 
(1999) suggests the achieving of three main objectives: 
1) Restructure intergovernmental grant systems in a way that they provide less financial 
support to the decentralized governments and “remove the perverse incentives that 
they often embody for fiscal behavior on the part of recipients”(Oates, 1999, p. 1144); 
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2) Reduce dependence of the decentralized governments on transfers from the central 
government by changing the revenue system so that local governments are able to 
finance their own budgets by having better access to the local tax revenues; 
3) Revise the use and limitations of debt financing to guarantee that debt practices are 
not used to finance the current account deficits. 
Although the importance of the independent local budgets is stressed, Oates (1999) 
acknowledges that depending on the circumstances and financial stability of individual 
communities, central transfers may still be necessary. To balance the authority of revenue 
collection and spending between regional and local governments, a state should follow two 
principles: 1) the amount of assigned to the regional or local level governments revenues should 
be sufficient to ensure proper financing of public services offered locally and in the benefit of 
local residents; and 2) collection of sub-national revenue paid by local residents regarding local 
services should be assigned to the local governments (Wahiu et al., 2011). 
All three types of decentralization can exist and occur in a government at the same time, 
as well as in isolation. In some cases, it is hard to clearly distinguish one type of decentralization 
from another. Successful and effective decentralization of authorities and power requires the 
presence of all three types of decentralization (Manor, 1999; Wahiu et al., 2011). To have any 
promise of success “[political] decentralization must be accompanied both by some fiscal 
decentralization (because it supplies financial resources) and by some […] administrative 
decentralization (because it supplies bureaucratic resources required for implementation)” 
(Manor, 1999, p. 7).  
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Decentralization theory and public services 
Decentralization of the government leads to changes in local governance, provision of 
public services, and public participation in decision-making. Below we discuss different aspects 
of the decentralization processes. 
 
Decentralization and improvement of services according to the local needs 
According to the theory, decentralization tends to improve local service provision by 
bringing the government closer to people. As Faguet (2014) notes, citing Wallis and Oates 
(1988), decentralization forces local governments to become more receptive to local needs. He 
illustrates this effect of decentralization by comparing centralized and decentralized systems. His 
study looks at the focus of local governments in each system. As a rule of thumb, in a centralized 
system, local government officials are usually appointed by higher-level authorities. Hence, they 
will be rather focused on pleasing officials of higher rank, that have authority over their political 
careers and standing, than local constituencies. On the other hand, municipal authorities in 
decentralized systems are elected by local citizens, so the government attention goes towards 
satisfying the needs of the local population. “Local” officials become local officials, whose 
tenure and career prospects are in the hands of the citizens they serve, who elect them” (Faguet, 
2014, p. 7). Additionally in order to satisfy local population recently decentralized governments 
tend to concentrate on policies that “are highly visible and quicker to achieve over policies that 
are less visible and take longer to achieve” (Cordeiro Guerra & Lastra-Anadón, 2019, p. 15). 
However, the empirical evidence shows inconsistent results of the effects of 
decentralization on the public services access and quality. As Faguet & Sánchez (2008) mention, 
from 24 articles published in World Development between 1997 and 2008 regarding 
decentralization, local governance, and responsiveness to the local needs, 11 found positive 
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outcomes while 13 reported negative. According to Freinkman (2010), fiscal decentralization 
measured as a share of local expenditures financed from local revenues has positive results on 
the reliability of utilities and the quality of provision in many regions in Russia. The results show 
that with an increase of one percentage point in the share of collected local revenues of 
municipal expenditures the number of breakdowns in utility networks reduces by 3-4 percent. In 
China Chen, Huang, & Li (2017) found that the level of public satisfaction with social services 
rises with fiscal decentralization. Interestingly, satisfaction with services significantly increases 
among the elderly, poor, and sick. On the other hand, Akin, Hutchinson, & Strumpf (2005) found 
that the provision of public goods related to health care from local government health budgets in 
Uganda was declining during the 1990s. This decline became more significant as the level of 
decentralization and local governments autonomy of decision-making were increasing. This 
study revealed the necessity for monitoring the lower levels of government in terms of 
expenditures and allocations of budgets following decentralization.  
Several studies investigated the effects of decentralization of education. The study 
conducted by Cordeiro Guerra & Lastra-Anadón (2019) shows that decentralization of education 
in high-income OECD countries results in negative outcomes in quality indicators but has 
positive results in access to education. Consistent with the results in OECD countries, Faguet & 
Sánchez (2014) found improvement in access to education measured as enrollment rates in 
Colombia. Also, access to education for the poor significantly improved due to increases in local 
government spending on education services after decentralization. A study in Argentina (Galiani, 
Gertler, & Schargrodsky, 2008) also found positive effects between decentralization of the 
education system and the quality of education as measured by students test scores. However, 
even with the overall improvement in the quality of services due to decision-making processes 
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occurring at a local level, this study shows that only rich but not poor communities benefit from 
decentralizing services. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the effects of decentralization in the quality 
and provision of health services. Several studies on infant mortality rates (Cavalieri & Ferrante, 
2016; Jiménez-Rubio, 2011; Kudamatsu, 2012) found positive impacts of decentralization on 
infant mortality. The effect of decentralization, however, depends on the level of autonomy in 
sources of income transferred to local authorities and the proportion of tax revenues collected 
and controlled by local governments. Besides decentralization, the share of health expenditure on 
GDP and level of education were also found to be statistically significant in the reduction of 
infant mortality (Jiménez-Rubio, 2011). A 2017 study by Jiménez-Rubio & García-Gómez of 
health care changes in Spain due to decentralization indicates that improvements in health are 
found in regions that are not just politically but also fiscally decentralized. These findings 
indicate that fiscal autonomy in decision-making at the local level has an impact on the effects of 
decentralization policies. Contradictory to the results in Jiménez-Rubio & García-Gómez 
research, another study, analyzing public satisfaction with health services, found no impact of 
decentralization on the change in satisfaction (Antón, Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernández Macías, & 
Rivera, 2014). According to Khaleghian (2004), the effects of decentralization on local public 
services are mixed and dependent upon a country’s income level. Low-income decentralized 
countries experience advances compared to centralized government systems in health services, as 
measured by the childhood immunization coverage rates. Middle-income countries have the 
opposite effect and show lower coverage rates for decentralized government systems. 
The study of the effects of public services quality and availability on the quality of life 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, & Prado-Lorenzo, 2012) shows that the quality of life 
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for the measured population depends on whether public or private companies provide the 
services. Public companies are better in providing public transportation, health care, and trade 
services while outsourced private companies provide better quality for water services and waste 
collection. One of the possible reasons of decentralized governments to separate some 
responsibilities between public and private service providers is that "local governments may be 
faced with too many responsibilities transferred from the national administration, and 
consequently they are forced to resort to the private sector for assistance" (Cuadrado-Ballesteros 
et al., 2012, pp. 77–78). Without this separation, the provision of services would probably 
decline. 
Considering the empirical results discussed above, we hypothesize that decentralization 
policies that result in an increase of the local government responsiveness to the local needs, a 
high level of fiscal autonomy, and a decision-making process to be closer to people lead to the 
improvement of the community satisfaction with public services.  
Hypothesis 1: decentralization leads to an improvement in the quality of public services.  
Also, in order to satisfy local constituencies, governments tend to focus on policies that 
produce the most results in a short time. Thus,  
Hypothesis 2: decentralization of democratic governments leads to a greater focus on 
public services that can demonstrate immediate improvements, (e.g. road infrastructure, public 
parks, etc.) than those that show impacts in the long term (e.g. cultural and sport facilities, 
medical institutions, etc.). 
 
Decentralization and local economy 
Fiscal decentralization tends to lead to an increase of government expenditures and, in 
case of greater decentralization and small sizes of governments bodies, to a “loss of certain 
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"economies of scale" with a consequent increase in costs of administration” (Oates, 1985, p. 
749). In the second half of the 20th century, governments have recognized this negative economic 
effect, and there have been several territorial reforms featuring decentralization of the central 
government followed by an amalgamation of municipalities that are too small to be 
administratively and economically efficient. Examples of such reforms can be found in Canada 
(Slack & Bird, 2013), Israel (Reingewertz, 2012), Scandinavian countries (Blom-Hansen, 2010; 
Hanes & Wikström, 2008, 2010; Nelson, 1992) and Western Europe (Allers & Geertsema, 2014; 
Tavares, 2018).  
The most common argument in favor of larger municipal bodies and municipal 
amalgamations is that larger territorial units are more economically efficient, can provide better 
public services with lower prices due to economies of scale and, overall, are more stronger and 
sustainable (Blom-Hansen, 2010, p. 51; Hanes & Wikström, 2010; Slack & Bird, 2013; Tavares, 
2018). However, some argue that bigger consolidated municipalities are not, in fact, as 
economically efficient. As Nelson (1992) mentions “[…] the conventional wisdom that 
consolidated units of local government are inherently superior to a more fragmented structure 
has been met with ever-increasing skepticism by local government analysts” (Nelson, 1992, p. 
50). Bish (2001) argues that the size of the government does not determine the cost of services. 
Both small and large municipalities can be economically efficient. Smaller municipalities can 
have low per capita cost of public services if they rely on contracts and partnerships with larger 
bodies or organizations where those services are economies of scale. Simultaneously, this kind of 




An empirical study of municipal amalgamation in Israel shows that amalgamation of 
communities led to a decrease of municipal spending of about 9%, while the quality level of 
public services remains the same (Reingewertz, 2012). The amalgamation of the city of Toronto, 
Canada with its surrounding regions (Slack & Bird, 2013), resulted in an increase of household 
expenditures for public services, and a reduction of public access and participation in local 
decision-making processes. Positive results such as an increase of financial abilities are observed 
for smaller and poorer municipalities that were included in a newly amalgamated city. Also, 
amalgamation resulted in the equalization of the levels of services for all residents within the 
boundaries of the newly created municipality around the city of Toronto.  
Thus, according to the economies of scale theory and empirical results we expect to have 
a positive relationship between the public satisfaction with local public services and the size of 
the community measured as the total population: 
Hypothesis 3: larger communities are more likely to have better public services due to 
economies of scale than smaller communities.  
 
Decentralization, diversity, and urbanization 
Decentralized governments tend to be more successful in implementing policies 
according to the needs of diverse populations and preferences of minority groups. Thus, a 
decentralized system provides more flexibility in accommodating the desires of a heterogeneous 
population. The reasons for decentralization to successfully address heterogeneous community 
needs as well as reduce ethnic conflicts and separatism may be in placating the needs of minority 
groups through “bringing the government closer to the people and increasing opportunities to 
participate in government” (Brancati, 2006, p. 651).  
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Empirical studies show inconsistent results. Alesina, Baqir, & Easterley (1999) found a 
positive relationship between the ethnic diversity of communities and the financing of public 
goods in the US. According to the study, ethnically heterogeneous jurisdictions show higher 
spending on core public goods, while the share of expenditure for these goods from local budgets 
remains lower than in ethnically homogeneous jurisdictions. Even though a high level of 
allocations for public goods such as schools, roads or public transportation in diverse regions is 
funded due to intergovernmental transfers rather than from revenue budgets, better financing 
should lead to an increase in the quality of services. Similarly, another study found a positive 
relationship between decentralization, the delivery of public services and an increase of 
heterogeneity of regional preferences (Besley & Coate, 2003).  
On the other hand, according to the study in Cote d’Ivoire (Sanogo, 2019), more 
homogeneous and less urbanized communities tend to benefit more from decentralization 
policies. Sanogo found that fiscal decentralization policies resulted in an increase of access to 
public services and reduction of poverty. The results show that less diverse and more urban 
municipalities are more likely to have improved access to public services. Among different 
public services that include education, health, water and sanitation services, the main 
enhancement is found to be in an increase in access to education. Due to contradictions in the 
empirical results, in this study, we will also test the effect of diversity and urbanization on the 
quality of services. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4: municipalities with less diverse demographics are more likely to have 
better public services than the diverse ones. 
Hypothesis 5: more urbanized municipalities are more likely to have better public 
services than less urbanized communities. 
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Therefore, we hypothesize that decentralization leads to better public services provided 
locally. These improvements are possible due to a range of reasons. Firstly, local governments 
are more responsive than the central government to specific local needs of the population. 
Secondly, decentralized governments are more successful than centralized governments in 
addressing the needs of a heterogeneous population. This is due to more local decision-making 
processes, promotion of public engagement and participation that allows governments to 
recognize and address the needs of the diverse population within communities. Finally, a 
decentralized system makes local government bodies more accountable in improving local public 
services and satisfying the needs of the voters by giving electoral power to constituencies. To test 




CHAPTER 3.    DECENTRALIZATION REFORM IN UKRAINE 
Background of the decentralization reform in Ukraine 
Over the last 5 years, from 2014 to 2019, Ukrainian local governments faced important 
changes in their administrative, financial, and political systems. The authority, funds, tax 
revenues, and responsibilities of central government agencies are being decentralized to the local 
governments. This devolution of power benefits cities of regional significance and amalgamated 
communities. Oblasts shifted their powers to the cities of regional significance, defined as 
economic and cultural centers with a population greater than 50,000 and developed industry. 
Amalgamated communities now combine powers and resources by merging together. These 
combined communities can create new relationships with rayouns, as well as establish direct 
fiscal relationships with the central government  (Levitas & Djikic, 2017). Decentralization 
reform shows positive economic results, improvement of public services and in the 
administrative system of relationships between the governments of different levels.   
The beginning of the decentralization reform in Ukraine is associated with the approval 
of The Concept of the reform of local self-government and the territorial organization of power 
in Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the Concept), the document that revealed the necessity for 
the decentralization reform. The Concept provided the first steps towards decentralization and 
was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on April 1, 2014 (International Alert/Ukrainian Center 
for Independent Political Research, 2017). The Concept acknowledges that The European 
Charter of Local Self-Government (The Chapter), that assures the political, administrative and 
financial independence of local authorities and establishes the principle of local self-government, 
has been ratified by Ukraine since 1997. However, the current Ukrainian legislation does not 
allow the system of local self-government to work effectively in a way that meets the needs of 
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modern society. Due to ineffective laws regarding administrative, fiscal and political systems, as 
well as the country’s unstable economy, local governments are limited in providing high quality 
administrative, public, and utility services for the whole population. Based on previously 
analyzed issues within the country, the Concept aims to create a mechanism and a time-frame for 
establishing an effective self-government system and administrative-territorial division that will 
likely provide Ukrainian society with democracy, high-quality services, and support of a healthy 
leaving environment.  
To implement the decentralization reform based on the Concept two steps shall be 
followed. The first step, planned to be implemented by the end of 2014, is concentrated on 
updating the legislation, while the second one, planned for the period 2015-2017, discusses 
mechanisms for the implementation of the decentralized system on a local level and 
amalgamation of communities. The initial step emphasizes the importance of adopting the 
Amendments to the Constitution that will provide a legal basis for a newly introduced 
administrative-territorial unit, amalgamated territorial community (ATC) or ‘hromada’, and 
solve jurisdictional conflicts due to the integration of ATCs and overlapping government bodies 
at different levels. Also, the Concept envisages the adoption of legislation that outlines a range of 
changes that will ensure democratic decision-making processes at a local level, public 
participation, and delineate the proper powers and rights of local governments as they are stated 
in the Constitution. The unification of public services, local elections, and community and 
regional planning processes were planned to take place during the following step. Both steps 




As it was discussed above, the decentralization reform should begin with the passing of 
proposed Amendments to the Constitution. These amendments would establish an 
administratively and politically decentralized self-governing system. According to the 
Amendments, a new administrative-territorial structure should represent a three-tier system that 
includes the regions (‘oblasts' and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), the districts, and the 
communities. The lowest tier that is represented by local governmental bodies, the community, 
includes cities, towns, and villages as well as communities that amalgamated on a volunteer 
basis. However, the Draft Law “On the Principles of the Administrative-Territorial System of 
Ukraine” that was supposed to be adopted by the end of 2014 has not passed final approval by 
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Rada), the unicameral parliament of Ukraine. The Draft Law 
was defined as urgent by the President, revised by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legal 
Policy and Justice, approved by The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and finally pre-approved 
by the Rada. Regardless, the document is still pending review. The pre-approval of the document 
was followed by massive protests outside of the Parliament building, during which four soldiers 
of The National Guard of Ukraine died (Homenko, 2016). The central Ukrainian government’s 
failure to pass the Amendments made the implementation of the administrative and political 
sides of the decentralization reform impossible in the timeframe established by the proposed 
Concept.  
Another reason for the delays in passing the Amendments to the Constitution is the 
occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the military conflict in the Donbass 
region that includes Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Figure 2). Interestingly, the commencement 
of the decentralization reform overlapped with the beginning of the military conflict in Ukraine. 
March 27th, 2014 is designated as the official day of the Russian occupation of Crimea as it is 
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stated in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262. As was stated earlier, The 
Concept of the reform of local self-government and the territorial organization of power in 
Ukraine was approved a few days later on April 1st. Almost simultaneously conflict emerged and 
engulfed the eastern part of Ukraine that spring. Pro-Russian separatists occupied parts of 
Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and have caused widespread physical and social destruction of 
urban environments throughout the region. Correctly or incorrectly, the decentralization reform 
became associated with the Minsk1 process (International Alert/Ukrainian Center for 
Independent Political Research, 2017, p. 4), an attempt at peace, in which Kremlin requested the 
introduction of a federal system in Ukraine (“Full text of the Minsk agreement,” 2015). In the 
light of the Minsk agreement, the parliamentary opposition pointed out a possible negative 
outcome in the approval of the Amendments, which would give the Donbass region a “special 
status” that might provoke the region to further separation from Ukraine. However, this reading 
of the document, according to the Prime Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Groysman, is 
misleading and no special status is mentioned or discussed in the Amendments. Instead, some 
areas of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts that are not under control of the Ukrainian government 
will be given specific regulations of local governing that promote successful integration and 
redevelopment of the region after its liberation (“Якщо особливості місцевого 
                                                 
1 As a result of a summit on February 11th, 2015, in Minsk, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany 
came to an agreement on a Package of Measures that are supposed to mitigate and eliminate the conflict in the 
Eastern part of Ukraine. The agreement includes 13 Measures.  
Paragraph 11 of the agreement states that Ukraine shall carry out decentralization reform that should be reflected in 
the Amendments to the Constitution that should include “a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas”. Paragraphs 4, 9 and 12 discuss the 
Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, a 
timeline for specifying the area that is included into the zone of the special regime, local elections and election rules 




самоврядування дадуть можливість реінтегрувати Донбас, то чому цього не може бути в 
Конституції України?,” 2015). 
 
Figure 2: Oblasts of Ukraine and non-government-controlled territories 
Source: The Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, Administrative territorial-structure of Ukraine, 2019.  




Regardless of the importance of approving the Amendments to the Constitution or the 
importance of the meeting the requirements of the Minsk agreements, the adoption process has 
stagnated. At this time, the reform is being implemented through changes to the current 
legislature by adopting a range of laws that establish decentralized government systems under 
the current Constitution. The main advancements made towards the reform include the launch of 
the administrative-territorial reform and volunteer amalgamation of communities, 
implementation of the fiscal reform, and delegation of power to provide public services to the 
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local governments, the lowest levels of administrative units. Nevertheless, a constitutional 
amendment is still required. 
Administrative-territorial division of Ukraine 
The administrative-territorial division in Ukraine is significantly fragmented, with a 
prevailing number of small rural communities all around the county that are disconnected from 
government administration and services. Because small rural communities were recognized to be 
economically inefficient and incapable of providing high-quality public services for the citizens, 
one of the focuses of the decentralization reform became the promotion of voluntary community 
amalgamations. As of March 1st, 2015, before the start of community amalgamations, the 
territory of Ukraine had the following structure. The country was divided into 27 regions 
including 24 oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and two cities – Kyiv and Sevastopol. 
Each region consists of districts or ‘rayouns’ and at that point totaled 490 districts across all of 
the regions of Ukraine. Districts are made up of cities, towns, and villages. In March 2015 there 
were 29,733 individual communities in Ukraine, from which only 1345 are considered urban 
types of communities - cities or towns (The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2015).  
As can be seen from Table 1, as a result of the decentralization reform, 8,784 urban and 
rural communities amalgamated voluntarily and created 714 newly merged communities, as of 
February 1st, 2019 (The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2019). Based on these numbers, the 
fragmentation of Ukrainian communities has shrunk by 27.14%. Figure 3 shows 704 of those 
communities that were established and held their first local elections over the four-year period 
from 2015 to 2018. This information was received from the Ministry of Regional Development, 




Table 1: Number of communities 
    Mar-15 Feb-19 
Number of amalgamated communities 0 714 
Number of communities that participated in amalgamation 0 8,784 
Number of communities in the county 29,733 29,720 
Number of communities considering AC instead of separated 
communities 
29,733 21,650 
% by which the number of adm-territorial units shrunk 
compared to the number of communities in March 2015 
 
27.20% 
Source: The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2019   
 
Figure 3: Amalgamated communities that were established and held their first local elections 
over the four-year period from 2015 to 2018  
Source: Ministry of Regional Development, Building and Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine 
 
 
Amalgamated communities receive several benefits from the merger. These can be an 
increasing size which allows for the establishment of economies of scale, more direct 
relationships with the central government budget, higher amounts of taxes and charges in local 
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budgets, and, additionally, subventions from the central government for infrastructure and 
community development. 
In April 2018 the Verkhovna Rada approved a law that provides the cities of regional 
significance, the communities that are economic and cultural centers, a simplified procedure of 
voluntary amalgamation with surrounding town and villages (Palchuk, 2018). The cities of 
regional significance are recognized by the law as capable amalgamated territorial communities. 
The important role of such cities as cultural, economic and development centers should give a 
boost to the surrounding communities if they are willing to merge. The amalgamation of 
communities of different sizes has great potential for successful development of smaller 
communities in the future. A study on amalgamation reform of 1952 in Sweden by Hanes & 
Wikström (2008) supports the merger of communities of different sizes. Their findings regarding 
heterogeneity of population size suggest that amalgamation of heterogeneously populated 
municipalities is a better strategy for population growth than the amalgamation of communities 
of equal size. Hanes & Wikström (2008) propose that this might be because consolidation of 
communities of different sizes creates a municipality center in the biggest community, where it 
might be easier to concentrate most of the resources and services. They also suppose that 
improved by amalgamation, the delivery of local public services might influence growth. 
Another study of the amalgamation of Toronto with its surrounding regions (Slack & Bird, 2013) 
shows that amalgamation of a highly developed area with small surrounding communities leads 
to the unification and equality of the quality of services provided within the merged 
municipality. Thus, the adoption of the new law in Ukraine is expected to provide positive 
results for the decentralization process and increase the number of volunteer amalgamations with 




Fiscal decentralization reform also introduced changes in the legislature and has been 
showing positive results. One of the first changes in the legislation were changes in the Budget 
and Tax Codes of Ukraine that fiscally decentralized all communities and “established a direct 
relationship between the newly amalgamated communities and the state budget” 
(Yesmukhanova, 2018, p. 9). The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine 
and Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Tax Reform" and The Law of Ukraine "On 
Amendments to the Budget Code of Ukraine on the Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations" were adopted on December 28th of 2014. After the changes, local governments gained 
full rights to allocate the funds according to the local needs. The modernized Budget and Tax 
Codes granted to the lowest levels of governments rights to collect their own revenues directly at 
a local level. Table 2 shows the amount of main taxes and charges to be transferred to the local 
budgets according to the updated legislature. The modernized Budget and Tax Codes grants the 
rights to collect their own revenues to the lowest levels of governments directly at a local level. 
Table 2 shows the amount of main taxes and charges to be transferred to the local budgets 
according to the updated legislature. As can be seen, the cities of regional significance receive as 
well as amalgamated communities receive 60% of personal income taxes that are collected 
within the jurisdictions of the cities. Except for the private enterprise income tax, rental change 
and payments for the use of natural resources, which are collected by the regional and the state 
budgets, and pollution tax, that is collected by the cities of regional significance in the amount of 
25%, the rest of the taxes is transferred directly to the local budgets in full amount. Moreover, we 
can see that the right to collect 60% of the personal income tax is an additional incentive for the 
communities to amalgamate because only cities of regional significance and amalgamated 
communities can collect personal income taxes. Otherwise, if communities are not amalgamated,  
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Table 2: Required amount of main taxes and charges to be transferred to local budgets, (% of 
taxes collected within the jurisdictions of the following municipalities) 















Personal income tax 15 60 60  
Private enterprise income tax 10    
Rental charge for the use of water and forest 
resources/subsoil use for extraction of 
national minerals 
50/25    
Payment for the use of other natural 
resources 
100    
Rental charge for special use of natural and 
subsoil resources of local significance 
 100  100 
Income tax for municipal enterprises and 
financial institutions 
100 100 100 100 
Charge for the grant of specific licenses and 
certificates 
100    
Administrative charge for state registration 
of entities and persons 
 100 100  
Charge for other administrative services  100  100 
Administrative charge for state registration 
of real estate rights and encumbrances 
 100 100 100 
State duty which belongs to the relevant 
budgets (at the place of carrying out the 
activity and issuing the documents) 
 100  100 
Excise tax from retail sale (tobacco, alcohol, 
oil products) 
 100  100 
Rental of property complexes and other 
property 
100 100 100 100 
Local taxes: single tax; property tax (land 
fee, real estate tax, transport tax) 
 100  100 
Local charges: tourist and parking  100  100 
Administrative fines and other penalties  100  100 
Pollution tax 55 25  25 
Source: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing 
and Communal Services of Ukraine, 2017. Fiscal decentralization in Ukraine: First successes. 
Note: The percentages reflect the amount of taxes collected on the territories that shall be paid to the 




60% of personal income tax collected within those communities is received by the district 
budgets. The updated tax allocation system, that establishes direct inter-budget relations with the 
state budget, also contributes to the growth of the local budgets. According to the Ministry of 
Regional Development, Building and Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine, the total 
cumulative revenues of the local budgets since the fiscal decentralization reform have grown 
significantly. Based on the forecast for 2019 local budgets will receive almost four times more 
funds that they had in 2014 at the beginning of the reform (Figure 4). According to Yanina 
Kazyuk, financial decentralization coordinator, these substantial improvements of the local 
budgets are possible due to “expansion of powers and an increase of the interest of local self-
government bodies in increasing revenues to local budgets, implementation of measures to draw 
resources for their filling and improving the efficiency of administration of taxes and fees" 
(“Фінансова децентралізація: експерти розповіли про результати 2018 року та перспективи 
2019,” 2019).  
According to Levitas & Djikic (2017), cities of regional significance benefit most from 
the fiscal decentralization reform. Although the share of their own revenues collected locally 
compose only 17 percent of the budgets, their total revenues increased by 14 percent. Levitas & 
Djikic explain this improvement due to the changes of the tax and charges collection and transfer 
to local budgets as well as due to transfers from the central government for the health and 
education sectors for which cities of regional significances expended their responsibilities. 
Fiscal decentralization also provides more opportunities for the smaller communities that 
amalgamated. The growth rate of the local budgets of the amalgamated communities tends to be 
higher compared to non-amalgamated municipalities. Interestingly, the bulk part of the local 




Figure 4: Cumulative revenues of the local budgets, (bn Ukrainian hryvnias) 
Source: Monitoring the Process of Decentralization of The Power and Reform of Local Government as of 
January 10, 2019. Ministry of Regional Development, Building and Housing and Communal Services of 
Ukraine, 2019 
 
amalgamated communities (“Фінансова децентралізація: експерти розповіли про результати 
2018 року та перспективи 2019,” 2019). In addition to the increase of the local budgets, the 
central government grants subventions for amalgamated communities for the community and 
local infrastructure development. There are also transfers for improvements in health care and 
education systems. 
Changes in service delivery 
Due to the decentralization of power amalgamated communities and cities of oblast 
significance are responsible for providing primary and secondary education, healthcare services, 
housing, utilities, and the construction and maintenance of roads and infrastructure. Since 2017 
to their responsibilities were added local economic development, planning, and public safety 
(Yesmukhanova, 2018). This is a much larger list of the authorities than were previously granted 
to the local governments. Now capable communities can allocate any funds from their local 












ministries were authorized to allocate and transfer to local authorities subsidy funds for 
development of education as well as health systems. Now the local governments have a better 
chance to recognize the most urgent local needs and properly distribute resources towards them. 
While there are no significant legislative changes in the provision of utilities and infrastructure 
maintenance, healthcare and education systems are under administrative restructure.  
Based on the Report of Successfulness of Amalgamation of Territorial Communities 
prepared by Swiss-Ukrainian Decentralization Support Project (DESPRO), ASK Reform, and 
Association of Amalgamated Territorial Communities, the results of the decentralization reform 
are positively rated by the heads of the amalgamated communities. The biggest improvements 
for Ukrainian communities since the beginning of the reform are in areas of urban environment 
and infrastructure, green spaces, street lighting, and the operation of educational and cultural 
institutions. Less frequent the heads mentioned the improvements in healthcare services and 
public transportation. Communities, first, have made improvements to the following issue areas: 
repair of the roads and sidewalks, the operation of schools and kindergartens, provision of 
utilities, and street lighting. Among the biggest problems with the reform were named the 
inconsistencies with legislation, the absence of skills and practical knowledge in planning and 
administration, and issues in the relationships between different levels of governments. 
 
Education 
Education along with the health care system is one of the most important parts of the 
decentralization reform. According to the Kennan Institute, as of May 2018 local governments, 
amalgamated communities and cities of regional significance were responsible for the 
management of 37.3 percent of all public schools. The rest remains under the authority of 
‘rayouns’, district governments, that are accountable to the central government (Rabinovych, 
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Levitas, & Umland, 2018). The changes to education also include the establishment of the “hub 
school” system. As of March 2018, 519 schools, located in the regional urban centers across the 
country, became hub schools. They are responsible for the guidance and supervision of 976 
branch schools located in smaller communities. They also own specific equipment, provide 
expertise and receive additional funds from the central government (Rabinovych et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, the biggest challenges in improving the quality of education endure small rural 
communities “where a shortage of human capital coincides with an over-abundance of tiny 
schools with very small classes, often counting fewer than 10 pupils per classroom” (Rabinovych 
et al., 2018, p. 4). Enlarging the schools in rural areas through an amalgamation of the 
communities should, hopefully, provide better financing, more human capital, and lead to an 
increase in the quality of education. 
 
Healthcare system 
Decentralization reform is expected to improve the quality of the healthcare system in 
Ukraine. In October 2017 several changes were adopted to the healthcare system. The 
Verkhovna Rada passed a new law that presents a health insurance system that gives patients the 
right to choose medical institutions and specialized medical professionals they prefer. Positive 
results of this reform are expected by 2020. According to the new legislation, the healthcare 
providers will receive payments for the operation costs directly from the central government 
based on the provided services instead of the number of beds as it was previously 
(Yesmukhanova, 2018). The reform also includes the rearrangement of the hospital districts 
through the merging of existing networks. The new system is expected to provide “more rational 
division of primary and secondary services across facilities, leading to higher-quality care” 
(Rabinovych et al., 2018, p. 4). Although the reform aims to improve the quality of services, the 
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lack of human capital in rural areas remains one of the greatest challenges of the healthcare 
system as well as education.   
Limitations that affect the decentralization reform 
There are other factors that might influence the success of the change in the quality of the 
services and utilities provided on the local level. One factor is a little experience of the 
communities in planning and development, responsibilities that became local under the 
decentralization reform. Another factor is that the level of public participation in the decision-
making process remains very low. According to the results of the Ukrainian Municipal Survey in 
2015 over 90% of the respondents from 22 cities have never participated in the city council 
meetings, executive committee of the City Council meetings (except in Khmenlinstkiy where 
87%, have never participated in the executive committee meetings), or regional council 
meetings. As we know from the literature an improvement in the quality of life and local public 
services occurs when the government addresses the needs of the population. However, with a 
low level of participation in the decision-making a local government has little chances to learn 
about local needs. This low level of participation is probably due to the absence of the 
experience of participation in the local governance previously and a common belief that even 
though the population speaks up about their needs the government would not address the issues. 
As the study by Hutcheson & Korosteleva (2006) show people in post-soviet regions have low 
participation level because they lost interest in politics. This lack of interest in civic affairs and 
political apathy takes its beginning in the Soviet regime when the central government had 
superior power over the decision making and the voices of the citizens had little impact. After 
the beginning of the decentralization reform, the building of trust between citizens and local 
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governments became one of the most important steps towards the reform's successful 
implementation.  
Summary 
Thus, although the important for the successful implementation of the decentralization 
reform Amendments to the Constitution are still pending approval, the reform is carried through 
the changes in the legislature. Changes that already took place show positive results. The sizes of 
the local budgets almost quadrupled since 2014 and continue to grow. Local governments gained 
more power and authorities to address local issues. Governments of the amalgamated 
communities and the cities of regional significance are responsible for providing primary and 
secondary education, healthcare services, housing, utilities, and the construction and 
maintenance of roads and infrastructure. Since 2017 to their responsibilities were added local 
economic development, planning, and public safety. Due to the decentralization reform, sectoral 
ministries were authorized to allocate and transfer to local authorities subsidy funds for the 
development of education as well as health systems. Reforms that are carried in healthcare and 
education systems are expected to bring positive results by 2020. The complications with the 
reform include the inconsistencies with legislation, the absence of skills and practical knowledge 




CHAPTER 4.    ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Data and Methodology 
Data 
In this section, we empirically analyze the impact of the decentralization policies in 
Ukraine on the quality of local public goods, services, and utilities in cities of regional 
significance. We are expecting to find an increase in the quality of local services and utilities, our 
first hypothesis. To do this we analyze how the quality of services was changing over the four-
year period, which cities experienced improvements and in which services. We also account for 
demographic, economic, and political variables and their influence on the quality of services.  
The data on the quality of the local services in major cities in Ukraine is collected from 
the Ukrainian Municipal Survey for years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. The Ukrainian Municipal 
Survey was conducted by the Rating Group Ukraine on behalf of the International Republican 
Institute (2015, 2016) and the Center for Insights in Survey Research (2017, 2018).  Through 
random sampling, 800 respondents at the age of 18 and older from 24 Ukrainian cities were 
selected and interviewed at home. The poll of the cities includes Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, 21 
oblast centers and two cities in Donbass region, Mariupol and Severodonetsk in Donetsk and 
Lugansk oblasts respectively. The survey did not cover the occupied territory of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea. Also, it should be noted that in 2015 the survey covered only Kyiv and 22 
oblast centers excluding the two cities in the Donbass region due to the military conflict. The 
sample is representative of the true population and weighted by sex, age, and education using 
data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Average response rate over the four years of the 
survey is 63%. 
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Dependent variable  
Every year following the decentralization reform, the respondents were asked to rate the 
quality of the services and/or public goods that are available in their city on the scale from 
excellent (5) to terrible (1). The respondents also were given a "difficult to answer" choice. For 
the purposes of this study 13 goods and services were selected from the survey and grouped for 
further analysis. Our dependent variable is the quality of the publicly provided goods and 
services in each of the 24 analyzed cities, measured on a scale from one to five, with five being 
the highest score. The unit of analysis is a city. The responses from the All Ukrainian Municipal 
Survey were recalculated in order to report the quality as a score. Table 3 lists the services, 
groups and their abbreviations.  
Table 3: Explanatory variables 
Service or good Group 
Sidewalks 
Public transportation (PubTrans) 
Public transport 
Roads 






Utilities (Util) Sewage 
Water supply 
Medical institutions Medical institutions (Med) 
Cultural venues Cultural venues (Cultural) 
Sport facilities Sport facilities (Sport) 
Public parks and gardens Public parks and gardens (Parks) 
 
To evaluate a change in the score over time, we look at the difference between the quality 
of services in 2015 and 2018. The change in the quality of services between the years 2015 and 
2018 is calculated as a percentage change based on the initial score.  For regression models, we 




The ability of a local government to affect the quality of local public services differ 
across the country and depends on the number of factors. Therefore, the study establishes a 
model of the change in the score of the quality of public services accounting for economic, 
demographic, and political proxies in each city. Definitions and sources of the explanatory 
variables are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4: Definitions and sources of the dependent and explanatory variables 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent variable 
Score of the quality 
of the public goods 
and services 
(SCORE) 
The score of the quality of each good and 
service based on the rating on the scale from 
excellent (5) to terrible (1) 





Index of ethnic 
fractionalization (EF) 
An index of ethnic fractionalization (EF) that 
measures the probability of two individuals 
randomly selected from the population belong 
to different ethnic groups 
All-Ukrainian population 
census. National composition 
of population, 2001. State 
Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine 
Cost of the utilities 
(COST) 
Utility cost for the population for water 
supply, trash collection and sewer for years 
2015-2018 
The official websites of each 
municipality 
Gross Regional 
Product per capita 
(GRP) 
Annual average market value of all goods and 
services produced in an oblast, obtained for 
years 2015-2017 
State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine 
Urbanization (URB) 
Percentage of people living in an urban area of 
the total population within each oblast, data 
for years 2015-2018 
State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine 
The level of 
corruption (CORR) 
The score of level of corruption of corruption 
in each analyzed city on the scale from a 
significant problem (2) to not a problem at all 
(-2) 






Estimates of the total population in each city, 
data for years 2015-2018  
State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine 
 
As we know from the literature, decentralized governments are more successful than 
centralized authorities in implementing policies according to the needs of diverse populations 
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and preferences of minority groups. Even though decentralized governments account for the 
diversity of needs within the municipalities, we predict that less diverse municipalities will have 
higher improvements in service quality. Due to the lack of data at the city level, we used data at 
the oblast level, a bigger territorial unit, to measure diversity. Data for each city is represented by 
the data for an oblast in which each city is located. This is obviously a limitation on the study 
because it assumes that the ethnic composition of an oblast is homogeneous within its boundaries 
and reflects the ethnic compositions of cities within the oblast. The ethnicity data was obtained 
from the All-Ukrainian population census 2001 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001) for 
the oblast level. We use an index of ethnic fractionalization (EF) that measures the probability of 
two individuals randomly selected from the population belong to different ethnic groups 
(Arkadiev, 2010). The higher the score the higher the ethnic fractionalization in a geographical 
area. It is calculated as 





Where 𝑝𝑖 - the proportion of an ethnic group in the total population, 
N – number of ethnic groups 
Due to inconsistent results from the empirical studies regarding the effects of 
decentralization on the quality of services, based on the sizes and economic characteristics of the 
communities, it is important to control for the economic variables such as the cost of utilities 
(COST) and Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita. The cost of the utilities was obtained 
from the official websites of each municipality and represents the cost of water supply, trash 
collection and sewer for years 2015-2018. To reflect the economic situation in each city, we use 
GRP per capita data for 2015, 2016, and 2017, the most recent data provided by the State 
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Statistics Committee of Ukraine (see Appendix B, Figure B.2). Similar, to the measure of ethnic 
fragmentation, there was no data at the city level, therefore, we used the GRP per capita 
observations from the oblast level.  Thus, the assumption that the proportions between different 
oblasts’ GRP per capita levels reflect the relationships between cities’ GRP per capita may be 
problematic and could affect our results. The total population of each city was obtained for each 
year of the 4-year period based on the estimates from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.  
For the analysis GRP per capita is calculated in thousands of hryvnas and the total population in 
each city is in thousands of people. 
The urbanization level (URB) is calculated as a percentage of people living in an urban 
area of the total population within each oblast. Level of urbanization is measured on the oblast 
level. This indicator is important for measuring the change of satisfaction with services that have 
not only local but also a regional level of service, like major medical institutions that serve not 
just the city but also surrounding areas. Urbanization also can impact cultural and sport services. 
Big football stadiums, for example, that hold national league games are located predominantly in 
the oblasts' centers. 
The level of corruption (CORR) was obtained from the Ukrainian Municipal Survey for 
the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. The respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of corruption 
in their city on the scale from a significant problem (2) to not a problem at all (-2). The 
respondents were also provided with the option to state "difficult to answer".  
 
The model 
We use a multiple regression model with a lagged explanatory variable to incorporate the 
feedback of the scores over time and test for significance of the rest of the explanatory variables 
in the model. We include a lagged dependent variable because we expect that the current level of 
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the quality of public services is determined by its past level. Thus, the analytical model (Model 
1) used to determine the change of quality satisfaction with public goods and services is as 
follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where: 
𝑌𝑡 - dependent variable - score of the quality of the public goods and services 
𝑆𝑐𝑡−1 - a lagged value of a score of the quality of the public goods and services as an 
independent variable  
𝑡  - time (year), 𝜀𝑡 – error 
To analyze the relationships and their magnitudes between the change in the quality of 
the services and ethnic, economic, demographic, and political proxies in each city, we use a 
multiple linear regression model (Model 2) defined as follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑅𝐵 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝜀  
Where: 
𝑌  - dependent variable - score of the quality of the public goods and services 
𝜀  – error 
CITY – dummy variable providing for the independence of observations 







Table 5: Change of the satisfaction score for goods and services between the years 2015 and 2018, in % 
City 
Medical institutions Sport facilities Education  Public parks and gardens 
2015 2018 change 2015 2018 change 2015 2018 change 2015 2018 change 
Cherkasy 2.73 2.52 -7.7% 2.81 2.97 5.7% 2.91 3.03 4.1% 3.45 3.44 -0.3% 
Chernihiv 2.74 2.51 -8.4% 2.96 2.86 -3.4% 3.09 2.99 -3.2% 3.19 3.64 14.1% 
Chernivtsi 2.91 2.64 -9.3% 2.94 2.72 -7.5% 3.53 3.06 -13.2% 3.16 2.91 -7.9% 
Dnipro 2.33 2.53 8.6% 2.78 2.83 1.8% 3.02 3.03 0.5% 3.14 3.14 0.0% 
Ivano-Frankivsk 2.51 2.64 5.2% 2.66 2.73 2.6% 2.92 2.86 -2.2% 3.07 3.45 12.4% 
Kharkiv 2.82 2.63 -6.7% 3.04 2.87 -5.6% 3.23 2.97 -8.2% 3.81 3.83 0.5% 
Kherson 2.83 2.48 -12.4% 2.59 2.64 1.9% 2.92 2.77 -5.3% 2.71 2.80 3.3% 
Khmelnytsky 2.73 2.60 -4.8% 2.79 2.99 7.2% 3.16 3.29 4.3% 2.97 3.35 12.8% 
Kropyvnytskyi 2.37 2.60 9.7% 2.56 2.77 8.2% 2.53 2.89 14.3% 2.91 3.29 13.1% 
Kyiv 2.47 2.56 3.6% 2.77 3.00 8.3% 2.81 2.78 -1.2% 3.07 3.34 8.8% 
Lutsk 2.51 2.84 13.1% 2.85 3.35 17.5% 2.86 3.28 14.7% 2.84 3.59 26.4% 
Lviv 2.77 2.68 -3.2% 2.87 2.77 -3.5% 3.06 2.92 -4.7% 3.29 3.33 1.2% 
Mariupol* 2.77 2.55 -7.9% 2.65 2.93 10.6% 2.96 3.02 2.0% 3.35 3.63 8.4% 
Mykolaiv 2.41 2.54 5.4% 2.55 2.64 3.5% 2.66 3.10 16.8% 2.59 2.95 13.9% 
Odesa 2.47 2.55 3.2% 2.62 2.95 12.6% 2.74  2.97 8.4% 2.99 3.39 13.4% 
Poltava 2.69 2.73 1.5% 2.78 2.93 5.4% 2.92 3.01 3.1% 3.04 3.01 -1.0% 
Rivne 2.56 2.66 3.9% 2.70 2.85 5.6% 2.88 3.20 11.1% 3.12 3.50 12.2% 
Severodonetsk* 2.48 2.44 -1.6% 2.74 2.31 -15.7% 2.86 2.84 -0.9% 2.66 2.46 -7.5% 
Sumy 2.28 2.40 5.3% 3.29 3.11 -5.5% 3.13 3.04 -2.9% 3.08 3.30 7.1% 
Ternopil 2.91 2.68 -7.9% 3.24 3.18 -1.9% 3.44 3.25 -5.4% 3.52 3.53 0.3% 
Uzhgorod 2.82 2.61 -7.4% 2.88 2.96 2.8% 3.09 3.42 10.7% 2.85 3.07 7.7% 
Vinnytsa 2.59 2.73 5.4% 3.02 3.23 7.0% 3.08 3.08 0.0% 3.71 4.00 7.8% 
Zaporizhia 2.49 2.54 2.0% 2.69 3.00 11.5% 2.91 3.31 13.6% 2.86 3.23 12.9% 
Zhytomyr 2.61 2.72 4.2% 2.75 3.00 9.1% 2.82 3.24 14.7% 2.91 3.23 11.0% 
Average score 2.62 2.60 -0.3% 2.81 2.90 3.3% 2.98 3.05 3.0% 3.10 3.31 7.1% 
min 2.28 2.40 -0.12 2.55 2.31 -0.16 2.53 2.77 -0.13 2.59 2.46 -0.08 
max 2.91 2.84 0.13 3.29 3.35 0.18 3.53 3.42 0.17 3.81 4.00 0.26 
sd 0.18617 0.10206 0.07058 0.1937 0.216 0.07492 0.22322 0.17603 0.08332 0.30839 0.33805 0.0789 
 
Note: highlighted sells denote a positive change in the score of the quality of a public service 






Table 5: continued 
City 
Cultural venues Public transportation Road infrastructure Average score 
2015 2018 change 2015 2018 change 2015 2018 change 2015 2018 change 
Cherkasy 2.97 3.13 5.4% 2.83 2.73 -3.5% 2.37 2.76 16.5% 2.87 2.94 2.5% 
Chernihiv 3.13 2.96 -5.4% 2.98 3.11 4.4% 2.71 3.10 14.4% 2.97 3.02 1.8% 
Chernivtsi 3.40 3.04 -10.6% 2.89 2.57 -11.1% 2.29 2.26 -1.3% 3.02 2.74 -9.1% 
Dnipro 2.97 2.80 -5.7% 2.56 2.89 12.7% 2.17 2.82 30.0% 2.71 2.86 5.6% 
Ivano-Frankivsk 2.97 2.99 0.7% 2.76 3.10 12.5% 2.47 2.95 19.5% 2.76 2.96 7.0% 
Kharkiv 3.28 3.04 -7.3% 3.13 3.25 3.8% 3.12 3.35 7.4% 3.20 3.13 -2.2% 
Kherson 2.82 2.74 -2.8% 2.62 2.47 -5.9% 2.21 2.42 9.5% 2.67 2.62 -2.1% 
Khmelnytsky 3.08 3.21 4.2% 3.02 3.08 1.8% 2.59 2.77 7.0% 2.90 3.04 4.7% 
Kropyvnytskyi 2.81 3.17 12.8% 2.39 2.83 18.7% 2.05 2.58 25.9% 2.52 2.88 14.3% 
Kyiv 2.86 3.20 11.9% 2.76 3.06 10.9% 2.51 3.06 21.7% 2.75 3.00 9.0% 
Lutsk 2.73 3.39 24.2% 3.08 3.30 7.3% 2.56 3.20 25.0% 2.77 3.28 18.2% 
Lviv 3.09 3.01 -2.6% 3.03 2.83 -6.8% 3.01 3.11 3.3% 3.02 2.95 -2.3% 
Mariupol 2.66 2.86 7.5% 2.98 3.00 0.5% 2.71 3.08 13.7% 2.87 3.01 4.9% 
Mykolaiv 2.79 2.94 5.4% 2.46 2.81 14.3% 2.24 2.80 24.8% 2.53 2.82 11.8% 
Odesa 2.76 3.15 14.1% 2.75 2.95 7.3% 2.37 2.88 21.6% 2.67 2.98 11.4% 
Poltava 2.89 3.03 4.8% 2.69 2.77 3.0% 2.41 2.77 15.0% 2.77 2.89 4.3% 
Rivne 2.85 3.31 16.1% 2.90 3.10 6.9% 2.51 2.82 12.4% 2.79 3.06 9.8% 
Severodonetsk 3.22 2.94 -8.7% 2.90 2.87 -1.2% 2.22 2.74 23.7% 2.73 2.66 -2.5% 
Sumy 3.49 3.13 -10.3% 2.13 2.60 21.8% 2.04 2.47 21.1% 2.78 2.86 3.1% 
Ternopil 3.40 3.24 -4.7% 3.07 3.17 3.4% 2.69 3.00 11.5% 3.18 3.15 -0.9% 
Uzhgorod 3.07 3.37 9.8% 2.42 2.51 3.9% 1.96 2.45 25.3% 2.73 2.91 6.9% 
Vinnytsa 3.14 3.44 9.6% 3.43 3.79 10.5% 3.32 3.68 10.8% 3.18 3.42 7.4% 
Zaporizhia 2.91 3.13 7.6% 2.41 2.93 21.8% 1.89 2.57 36.0% 2.59 2.96 14.0% 
Zhytomyr 2.87 3.14 9.4% 2.95 2.97 0.5% 2.69 2.87 6.7% 2.80 3.02 8.0% 
Average score 3.01 3.10 3.6% 2.80 2.94 5.7% 2.46 2.85 16.7% 2.82 2.96 5.2% 
min 2.66 2.74 -10.6% 2.13 2.47 -0.11 1.89 2.26 -0.01 2.52 2.62 -0.09 
max 3.49 3.44 24.2% 3.43 3.79 0.22 3.32 3.68 0.36 3.20 3.42 0.18 
sd 0.22673 0.18062 9.3% 0.29607 0.28792 0.08617 0.35838 0.31908 0.09087 0.19103 0.17665 0.06445 
 
Note: highlighted sells denote a positive change in the score of the quality of a public service 




Empirical results and discussion 
Road infrastructure 
The greatest improvement in the service quality can be seen in the road infrastructure 
group that includes the scores for quality of roads and street lighting. Over the period from 
2015 to 2018 the residents of 23 out of 24 surveyed cities in Ukraine rated the quality of road 
infrastructure as improved (Table 5). The average improvement among all surveyed cities 
since 2015 is 16.7 percent. Only the City of Chernivtsi experienced a slight decline of 1.3% 
in the quality of road infrastructure since the beginning of the decentralization reform. 
Despite the fact that the quality of road infrastructure experienced the most growth in 
percentages compared to the score in 2015, its overall quality remains one of the lowest 
among the seven service groups. In 2018 only medical institutions, the average quality of 
which slightly decreased since 2015, had a score lower than the score of the road 
infrastructure. 
Model 1 (Table 6) shows that the change in the score of the road infrastructure among 
the surveyed cities was curve-linear (see Appendix A). The significant results for the variable 
Yr that indicates the number of years past the decentralization reform denotes a positive 
relationship between years and the quality. Lagged effect of the quality score on itself 
amounts to 0.78 increase in this year score for 1 point increase in the previous year score.   
Model 2, the results of which are presented in Table 7, show that GRP per capita and 
the level of corruption are strongly associated with a change in the road infrastructure score. 
An increase of GRP per capita by 10 points is associated with the improvement of the score 
by 0.07 points, ceteris paribus. This suggests that the improvements in local economy are 
reflected in the improvement of the road infrastructure. A reduction of the level of corruption  
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Table 6: Model 1 results for the quality of services 
 
Table 7: Model 2 results for the quality of services 
 
 
                                      Dependent variable SCORE for the following services                
 
 
Independent variable             Med      Sport      Edu      Parks   Cultural  PubTrans    Roads 
   
 
Yr                            0.471***  0.691***  0.592***  0.629***  0.877***   0.478**  0.458***  
                               (0.151)   (0.183)   (0.144)   (0.153)   (0.157)   (0.229)   (0.172)  
                                                                                                    
Yr2                           -0.096**  -0.163*** -0.139*** -0.148*** -0.202***  -0.091   -0.108**  
                               (0.037)   (0.046)   (0.036)   (0.038)   (0.039)   (0.056)   (0.043)  
                                                                                                    
Lagged SCORE                  0.469***  0.644***  0.523***  0.877***   0.553***  0.533***  0.783*** 
                               (0.093)   (0.097)   (0.088)   (0.063)   (0.086)    (0.098)   (0.066) 
                                                                                                    
EF                             -0.001    -0.002    -0.001    -0.002    -0.001   -0.004**   -0.003*  
                               (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
                                                                                                    
POP                           -0.00001   0.00000  -0.0001**  0.00002  -0.00001   0.00002   0.00003  
                              (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
                                                                                                    
URB                            -0.0003   -0.001    -0.001    0.0004    -0.002     0.003     0.003   
                               (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
                                                                                                    
Constant                      0.901***    0.502   1.032***   -0.087    0.743**    0.720     0.179   
                               (0.335)   (0.367)   (0.341)   (0.264)   (0.349)   (0.434)   (0.239)  
                                                                                                    
 
Observations                     72        72        72        72        72        72        72     
R2                              0.416     0.531     0.565     0.803     0.595     0.430     0.794   
Adjusted R2                     0.362     0.488     0.525     0.785     0.558     0.377     0.775   
Residual Std. Error (df = 65)   0.140     0.177     0.139     0.150     0.147     0.215     0.170   
F Statistic (df = 6; 65)     7.726***  12.265*** 14.083*** 44.277*** 15.922*** 8.173***  41.678*** 
 
 




                                        Dependent variable SCORE for the following services       
 
 
Independent variable             Med     Sport      Edu      Parks   Cultural  PubTrans    Roads   
 
  
EF                             0.240**   0.157     0.134     0.069    0.271**    0.191    -0.003 
                               (0.115)  (0.118)   (0.105)   (0.096)   (0.108)   (0.182)   (0.113)  
                                                                                                   
GRP                             0.001    0.004     0.003     0.003     0.004*   -0.007*   0.007***   
                               (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)  
                                                                                                   
POP                             0.002   -0.002    -0.003     0.002     0.001    -0.002    -0.004 
                               (0.005)  (0.005)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.007)   (0.005)  
                                                                                                   
URB                           -0.621**  -0.397    -0.343    -0.336    -0.659*   -0.500    -0.022   
                               (0.264)  (0.271)   (0.241)   (0.221)   (0.249)   (0.418)   (0.261)  
                                                                                                   
CORR                           -0.208  -0.294**  -0.274**  -0.426*** -0.462*** -0.446**   -0.357** 
                               (0.137)  (0.140)   (0.124)   (0.114)   (0.128)   (0.216)   (0.135)  
                                                                                                   
Constant                       34.554**  24.152*  21.819*  21.607*   36.964***  30.316     5.346  
                               (13.508) (13.857)  (12.305)  (11.296)  (12.705) (21.373)   (13.334)  
                                                                                                   
 
Observations                     70        70       70        70        70        70        70     
R2                              0.650    0.752     0.757     0.898     0.765     0.612     0.904   
Adjusted R2                     0.425    0.593     0.601     0.832     0.614     0.362     0.842   
Residual Std. Error (df = 42)   0.151    0.155     0.137     0.126     0.142     0.239     0.149   
F Statistic (df = 27; 42)     2.892***  4.720***  4.846*** 13.696*** 5.057***   2.453*** 14.583***  
 
 




in the local government also significantly influences a change in the quality of road 
infrastructure. The reduction of the corruption score by 1 point is associated with an increase 
of the quality score by 0.357 points. This relationship suggests  the natural hindrance of 
dishonest conduct and corruption on the public provision of good and services. We found no 
relationship between ethnic fractionalization, level of urbanization or the total population and 
the score of the road infrastructure. 
Overall, the quality of road infrastructure notably improved since 2015. Similar to the 
results presented by the Report of Successfulness of Amalgamation of Territorial 
Communities, we can assume that Kyiv and the cities of regional significance made the road 
infrastructure one of their first priorities. The significant improvements in the quality of road 
infrastructure over the past four years point out that the communities greatly focus on 
increasing the quality of this service. The service that at the beginning of the decentralization 
reform had the lowest among the seven service scores, 2.46 out of 5, unsurprisingly attracts 
the most attention from the decentralized communities.  
 
Public parks and gardens 
The second highest average percentage change from 2015 to 2018 occurred in the 
quality of public parks and gardens. The average improvement in the quality of parks and 
gardens comprises a 7.1 percent change among all surveyed cities. Only four out of 24 cities 
in the poll experienced a decline in the quality of public parks. The significant improvement 
in the quality of public parks and gardens is not surprising. As Berney (2011) states in her 
research, among different types of public or infrastructure projects, improvement and 
development of public spaces, including parks and gardens, is considered by local 
governments to be easy and cheap to implement while producing visible results. Moreover, 
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public parks are “framed, messaged, and staffer as spaces of citizen encounter and they in 
turn shape citizen relationships” (Berney, 2011, p. 29). Therefore, an improvement of public 
parks and gardens might help citizens to shape their identity as a part of the community and 
increase feelings of responsibility for the future of the community they belong to.  
Model 1 shows results similar to the road infrastructure. The change in the quality of 
the public parks and gardens appears to be linear. The coefficient of lagged quality score of 
the road infrastructure indicates 0.877 points increase in the quality in the following year for 
every 1 point increase in the quality in the previous year’s score.  For graphical evidence of 
the change of the score over the time, see Appendix A, Figure A.2 for predicted values. As 
can be seen from Figure A.2, the change in the quality of public parks and gardens between 
2016 and 2017 was more significant than the change in the period 2017-2018. This suggests 
that the greater increase in the quality of public parks and gardens occurred shortly after the 
begging of the reform, and later it took a slower pace.  
Model 2 shows that the level of corruption is statistically significant when looking at 
the quality of public parks and gardens. A reduction of the corruption score by 1 point is 
associated with an increase in the quality of public parks and gardens score by 0.426 points. 
We found no relationship between the ethnic fractionalization, GRP per capita, level of 
urbanization or population change and the score of quality of public parks and gardens.  
Sport facilities and cultural venues 
As a result of the decentralization process, the capable local governments are now 
responsible for improving the quality of life, including its socio-cultural aspects. Bringing 
communities together through sport and culture is one of the goals of the decentralization 
reform. Communities that received additional authority and funds due to decentralization 
now have an opportunity to decide how to improve their socio-cultural life and recreation.  
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The overall improvement in the quality of cultural venues throughout the country is 
estimated to be 3.6%, which brings the average score to 3.1 out of 5 in 2018. Among the 
surveyed cities, 15 (62.5 percent of the poll) experienced an improvement in this score over 
the last 4 years. The biggest improvement was noticed by the citizens of Lutsk. The city's 
work on the cultural facilities improved the score by 24.2 percent increasing it from 2.73 to 
3.39, what became the second-best score among the surveyed cities. In the two cities that had 
the best scores in the quality of cultural venues in 2015, Chernivtsi and Sumy, with 3.40 and 
3.49 scores respectively, the quality decreased by more than 10 percent. This might be due to 
the difficulties and limitations of the method of survey data collection. We should mention 
that when answering Likert-type questions, respondents tend to avoid "extremes", ‘excellent' 
or ‘terrible' choices. Therefore, the central choices get more usage causing the results to 
anchor around the central choice mostly eliminating a possibility of the maximum or 
minimum possible score even though that might be the accurate representation of the reality 
(Bishop & Herron, 2015). The anchoring effect that limits the possibilities of service to reach 
score 4 out of 5 might be one of the possible explanations of why the scores in Chernivtsi and 
Sumy decreased. 
 Similar to trends we observed in the quality of cultural venues, we can see an overall 
average improvement in the quality of sport facilities, a change of 3.3 percent. 17 out of 24 
surveyed cities (71 %) experienced an increase in the quality of sport facilities. The leading 
cities with more than 10% improvements to the quality of sport facilities are Lutsk (17.5%), 
Odesa (12.6%), Zaporizhia (11.5%) and Mariupol (10.6%). The biggest decline in the quality 
of services was experienced by the citizens of Severodonetsk (-15.7%).   
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According to the results of Model, the coefficient of lagged quality score of cultural 
venues indicates 0.55 points increase in the quality in the following year for every 1 point 
increase in the quality in the previous year’s score.  The same for the quality of the sport 
facilities indicates 0.64 points increase in the quality in the following year for every 1 point 
increase in the quality in the previous year’s score.  For predicted values of the change of the 
score over time, see Appendix A, Figure A.6 for the quality of cultural venues and Appendix 
A, Figure A.4 for the quality of sport facilities.  As can be seen from figures A.4 and A.6, the 
quality of both services between years 2016 and 2017 significantly increased, while between 
the period 2017-2018 the quality slightly decreased. This suggests that an increase in the 
quality of sport and cultural facilities occurred shortly after the begging of the reform and 
later it has stagnated. 
According to Model 2, a reduction in the corruption score by 1 point is associated 
with an increase in the quality of sport facilities by 0.29 points. The same for cultural venues 
is associated with an increase in the quality of by 0.46 points. Moreover, the quality of 
cultural venues is positively associated with the ethnic fractionalization and negatively 
associated with the level of urbanization. Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization and higher 
numbers of ethnic groups, we speculate, are bringing more diversity to the cultural life of the 
communities and potentially positively affect the quality of cultural facilities. The negative 
relationship between the quality of cultural venues and the level of urbanization shows that it 
is easier to provide higher quality services in less populated areas. This could be attributed to 
overcrowded venues in more urban areas, for example, or a greater possibility for a venue to 
make an impact in cultural life of a community.  
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Comparing the results in the changes of the road infrastructure, parks and gardens, 
sport, and cultural venues, we see that the improvements of the first two services are higher 
than the changes in the quality of the sport and cultural facilities. This can be explained by 
the differences in the length of necessary time periods for any positive change to occur. 
Although the quality of roads and public parks can increase over one or two seasons, socio-
cultural services require more time for the visible improvements to happen. Another factor 
that might slow down improvements in socio-cultural areas, is the limited availability of the 
human capital that is necessary to boost the quality of life in a community. It requires more 
specialized labor to build a sporting complex than a road. 
 
Public transportation 
Cities in Ukraine heavily rely on public transportation as the most commonly used 
means for commuting. Since the beginning of the decentralization reform, the quality of 
public transportation improved on average by 5.7%. The average score increased from 2.80 
to 2.94. 19 out of 24 cities (79%) experienced an improvement in the quality of public 
transportation. The biggest improvement, 21.8%, was noticed by the citizens of Sumy, where 
the quality of the public transportation was the lowest in 2015, and Zaporizhia that increased 
the quality score from 2.41 to 2.93. The leading city in the quality of public transportation 
remained the same. The City of Vinnitsa had the highest score in 2015 and improved the 
quality by 10.5%, which resulted in a quality score of 3.79 on the scale of 5.  
According to the results from Model 1, the coefficient of lagged quality score of 
public transportation indicates 0.53 points increase in the quality in the next year for every 1 
point increase in the quality in the previous year’s score.  The quality of public transportation 
has been increasing steadily over the period from 2016 to 2018 (see Appendix A, Figure 
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A.7).  Model 1 also shows that each additional point of ethnic fractionalization is associated 
with a decrease in the quality of public transportation. Model 2 shows that the quality of 
public transportation has a statistically significant negative relationship with the change of 
the GRP per capita and level of corruption. Interestingly, a decrease of GRP per capita by 10 
points is associated with a decrease of the score by 0.07. This is contrary to our hypothesis 
where we expected to see a positive relationship between an increase of the GRP per capita 
and an improvement in the quality of the public services. However, we need to mention that 
the significance level of this relationship indicates that there is 10% probability that the 
results are due to chance.  
Similar to other the other services measured, there is strong a relationship between the 
level of corruption and the quality of public transportation. A reduction of the corruption 
score by 1 point is associated with an increase in the quality of sport facilities by 0.45 points. 
Again, for public transportation, we expected an increase in the quality of the service with 
any decrease in fraudulent or corrupt conduct of those in power. 
 
Education 
The average quality of education increased since the beginning of the decentralization 
reform by just 3.0%. Only 13 communities showed an increase in the quality and one 
community remained the same score, while 10 cities experienced a decrease in the quality of 
the education system. As we know, the decentralization reform aims to restructure the 
education system through the establishment of the hub-branch school system. It is expected 
that the implementation of this reform will take more time and the positive results will be 
seen after 2020. 
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Initially, in 2015 the quality of education on average was rated by the respondents 
relatively high, the quality of education was third after public parks and gardens and cultural 
venues. After the improvement of 3% on average among all cities, it remains in third place 
reaching the score of 3.05 points. 
Model 1 shows that the coefficient of lagged quality score of education indicates 0.52 
points increase in the quality in the following year for every 1 point increase in the quality in 
the previous year’s score. As can be seen from Figure A.5, the quality of education 
significantly increased between 2016 and 2017, while between the period 2017-2018 the 
quality slightly decreased, similar to what be observed in the quality of cultural and sport 
facilities.   
Although the change in the population from Model 1 has an effect on the regression 
model, it does not have a substantive significance, or, in other words, the observed effect is 
too small to be meaningful. The population of a city should increase by 1,000,000 to 
influence an increase of a score by 0.1 points. Considering that the total population in 
Ukraine is slightly decreasing and only a few cities experience growth, it is very unlikely that 
a significant increase in the population will occur in the future. 
Model 2 shows that the quality of education has a negative relationship with the level 
of corruption. A reduction of the corruption score by 1 point is associated with an increase in 
the quality of public parks and gardens score by 0.426 points.  
 
Medical institutions 
The healthcare reform was launched in 2017 and has not had enough time to show 
sufficient results. However, the local governments have been receiving medical subventions 
the allocation of which was first approved by the law ‘Some issues of providing a medical 
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subvention from the state budget to local budgets’ from January 23rd, 2015. The medical 
subvention can be used to pay current expenditures of the health facilities and health care 
programs. It also can be allocated towards the optimization of the network of health facilities.  
The average score for the quality of the medical facilities slightly decreased by 0.3% 
over the 4-year period starting in 2015. In 2018 the average score is estimated to be 2.6, the 
lowest among the seven services. This is the only service that dropped in the average score. 
Only 13 out of 24 (54%) cities experienced an increase in the quality of the medical 
institutions with the highest improvement of 13.1% in Lutsk.  
Model 1 shows that the coefficient of lagged quality score of medical institutions 
indicates 0.47 points increase in the quality in the following year for every 1 point increase in 
the quality in the previous year’s score. Figure A.3 (see Appendix A) shows, that the quality 
of medical institutions is increasing over time; however, the pace of the increase is the 
slowest among all analysed services.    
Model 2 shows that the quality of medical institutions is positively and significantly 
associated with the ethnic fractionalization and negatively associated with the level of 
urbanization. Similar to cultural venues, a negative relationship between the quality of 
medical institutions and the level of urbanization shows that it is easier to provide higher 
quality medical services in less urbanized areas where the number of patients and thus, the 
demand on institutions, will be lower.   
The achievement of visible improvements in the healthcare system and quality of 
medical institutions will take more time that it took for the quality of road infrastructure and 
public parks and gardens to increase. Considering the fact that as of 2018 the medical 
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institutions had the lowest average score among analyzed cities, there is an urgent need in the 
reform of health care system. 
 
Utilities 
Among three utility services that we considered in the study, trash removal, sewer, and water 
supply, the same improvement of the quality of 5.12% occurred in water supply  and sewer, 
while the quality of trash collection increased by only 3.51% (Table 8). The average score of 
the quality of water supply increased from 3.22 to 3.36 on the 5-level scale. 20 out of 24 
cities (83%) experienced an increase in the quality of water supply. The leader in the 
improvements is the city of Uzhgorod. Over the 4-year period, the city improved the quality 
of water supply by 36.5% and reached a score of 2.99 which is, nevertheless, is one of the 
lowest scores among the surveyed cities. Substantial increase in the quality also is noticed by 
the citizens of Khmelnitsky (14.5%), Kropyvnytsky (12.7%), Lutsk (19.2%), and Mariupol 
(10.6%). The biggest decline in the quality of water supply is observed in the City of Kharkiv 
(-8.6%). 
On average the score of the quality of sewer increased from 2.97 to 3.12 over the 4-
year period. The respondents in 20 out of 24 cities (83%) noticed an improvement in the 
quality of the service, while in only 4 cities the quality decreased. The best results in the 
improvement of sewer are shown by the City of Zaporizhia with 14.44% increase of the 
score. Contrary, the quality of provision of sewer in Chernivtsi declined by 19.3%. Due to 
the negative results in the past 4 years, the quality of sewer in Chernivtsi in 2018 was the   
improvements were noticed in 17 cities (71%). The best results in improving the quality of 
trash removal are experienced by the citizens of Mariupol. The quality of the service 






Table 8: Change of the satisfaction score for utilities between the years 2015 and 2018, in % 
City 
Trash removal Sewer Water supply Average score 
2015 2018 change 2015 2018 Change 2015 2018 change 2015 2018 change 
Cherkasy 3.34 2.91 -12.87% 3.26 3.11 -4.60% 3.53 3.57 1.13% 3.38 3.20 -5.33% 
Chernihiv 3.11 3.22 3.54% 2.99 3.14 5.02% 3.4 3.24 -4.71% 3.17 3.20 1.05% 
Chernivtsi 3 2.64 -12.00% 2.96 2.39 -19.26% 3.15 2.98 -5.40% 3.04 2.67 -12.07% 
Dnipro 2.77 3.16 14.08% 2.92 3.1 6.16% 3.22 3.26 1.24% 2.97 3.17 6.85% 
Ivano-Frankivsk 3.09 3.23 4.53% 2.98 3.09 3.69% 3.31 3.36 1.51% 3.13 3.23 3.20% 
Kharkiv 3.71 3.89 4.85% 3.54 3.68 3.95% 3.7 3.38 -8.65% 3.65 3.65 0.00% 
Kherson 3.01 2.83 -5.98% 2.89 3.02 4.50% 3.09 3.18 2.91% 3.00 3.01 0.44% 
Khmelnytsky 3.01 3.13 3.99% 2.75 3.07 11.64% 3.03 3.47 14.52% 2.93 3.22 10.01% 
Kropyvnytskyi 3.06 3.22 5.23% 2.7 3.03 12.22% 3.06 3.45 12.75% 2.94 3.23 9.98% 
Kyiv 2.89 3.19 10.38% 2.92 3.18 8.90% 3.15 3.21 1.90% 2.99 3.19 6.92% 
Lutsk 3.18 3.41 7.23% 2.99 3.28 9.70% 3.12 3.72 19.23% 3.10 3.47 12.06% 
Lviv 3.57 3.38 -5.32% 3.1 3.27 5.48% 3.78 3.76 -0.53% 3.48 3.47 -0.38% 
Mariupol 3.1 3.78 21.94% 3.18 3.29 3.46% 3.03 3.35 10.56% 3.10 3.47 11.92% 
Mykolaiv 2.7 3.2 18.52% 2.66 2.91 9.40% 3.24 3.2 -1.23% 2.87 3.10 8.26% 
Odesa 3.09 3.28 6.15% 2.66 2.96 11.28% 3.26 3.26 0.00% 3.00 3.17 5.44% 
Poltava 3.21 2.98 -7.17% 2.97 2.92 -1.68% 3.22 3.17 -1.55% 3.13 3.02 -3.51% 
Rivne 3.34 3.18 -4.79% 3.11 3.21 3.22% 3.38 3.5 3.55% 3.28 3.30 0.61% 
Severodonetsk 3.28 3.39 3.35% 3.11 3.38 8.68% 3.39 3.65 7.67% 3.26 3.47 6.54% 
Sumy 2.68 3.02 12.69% 2.64 2.92 10.61% 2.8 3.06 9.29% 2.71 3.00 10.84% 
Ternopil 3.36 3.64 8.33% 3.11 3.42 9.97% 3.37 3.49 3.56% 3.28 3.52 7.22% 
Uzhgorod 3.39 2.94 -13.27% 2.62 2.54 -3.05% 2.19 2.99 36.53% 2.73 2.82 3.29% 
Vinnytsa 3.8 3.93 3.42% 3.39 3.62 6.78% 3.61 3.77 4.43% 3.60 3.77 4.81% 
Zaporizhia 2.83 3.23 14.13% 2.84 3.25 14.44% 3.06 3.35 9.48% 2.91 3.28 12.60% 
Zhytomyr 3.04 3.14 3.29% 3.07 3.14 2.28% 3.2 3.35 4.69% 3.10 3.21 3.44% 
Average score 3.15 3.25 3.51% 2.97 3.12 5.12% 3.22 3.36 5.12% 3.11 3.24 4.34% 
min 2.68 2.64 -13.27% 2.62 2.39 -19.26% 2.19 2.98 -8.65% 2.71 2.67 -12.07% 
max 3.80 3.93 21.94% 3.54 3.68 14.44% 3.78 3.77 36.53% 3.65 3.77 12.60% 




(18.52%), and Sumy (12.7%) also significantly improved the quality of trash removal. 
Overall, the quality of utilities improved by 4.34% with 19 cities having positive results, one 
city being stable, and 4 cities experiencing a decline in the average score of utilities. The City 
of Zaporizhia shows the best results with the 12.6% improvements in the quality. 
Model 1 shows that the coefficient of lagged quality score of trash collection 
indicates 0.49 points increase in the quality in the following year for every 1 point increase in 
the quality in the previous year’s score. The same for water supply and sewer amounts to 
0.66 points and 0.54 points increase respectively in the quality in the following year for every 
1 point increase in the quality in the previous year’s score (see Appendix A, Figure A.8). 
Even though the coefficients of ethnic fractionalization (-0.005) and the level of urbanization 
(0.005) on the quality of sewer services from Model 1 are significant in the regression model, 
they do not have a substantive significance. The same can be said of the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization on the average quality of services. 
The only statistically significant effect from Model 2 is the effect of the level of urbanization 
on the quality of water supply. A reduction in the level of urbanization by 1 point is 
associated with an increase in the quality of water supply by 0.482 points. Similar to cultural 
venues and the quality of medical institutions, lower levels of urbanization show that it is 
easier to provide higher quality water supply services when there is a smaller demand on the 






Table 9: Model 1 results for the quality of utilities 
 
Table 10: Model 2 results for the quality of utilities 
  
 
                                           Dependent variable SCORE for utilities           
 
Independent variable      Trash                 Water                  Sewer               Average      
  
 
Yr                         0.710**                0.140                 0.602***              0.195          
                           (0.353)               (0.184)                (0.216)              (0.137)         
                                                                                                             
Yr2                        -0.172*                -0.016                -0.124**              -0.037         
                           (0.090)               (0.044)                (0.053)              (0.035)         
                                                                                                             
Lagged SCORE              0.486***               0.662***               0.542***             0.785*** 
                           (0.116)               (0.078)                 (0.096)             (0.067) 
                                                                                                               
EF                         -0.003                 -0.002                -0.005**             -0.002*         
                           (0.003)               (0.002)                (0.002)              (0.001)         
                                                                                                               
POP                        0.0004                -0.0002                 0.0004               0.0001         
                           (0.001)               (0.0004)               (0.0004)             (0.0003)        
                                                                                                               
URB                         0.004                 0.001                 0.005**               0.003          
                           (0.004)               (0.002)                (0.002)              (0.002)         
                                                                                                               
COST                        0.006                 -0.003                -0.012                0.006 
                           (0.007)               (0.011)                (0.018)              (0.008) 
                                                                                                               
Constant                    0.753                0.945***                0.609                0.315          
                           (0.600)               (0.308)                (0.387)              (0.267)         
                                                                                                               
 
Observations                 68                     71                     71                     72           
R2                          0.289                 0.635                  0.531                  0.740          
Adjusted R2                 0.207                 0.594                  0.479                  0.711          
Residual Std. Error   0.313 (df = 60)       0.174 (df = 63)        0.205 (df = 63)        0.133 (df = 64)     
F Statistic        3.491***(df=7; 60)   15.629***(df=7; 63)    10.190***(df=7; 63)    25.984***(df=7; 64) 
 
 




                                       Dependent variable SCORE for utilities             
 
Independent variable      Trash                 Water                  Sewer               Average      
  
 
EF                       -0.319               0.141                0.217               0.044      
                         (0.366)             (0.117)              (0.178)             (0.110)       
                                                                                                    
GRP                      -0.004               0.001                0.001               0.0003       
                         (0.011)             (0.003)              (0.004)             (0.002)       
                                                                                                   
POP                      -0.145              -0.020                0.037               0.059        
                         (0.257)             (0.045)              (0.070)             (0.044)       
                                                                                                   
URB                       0.489              -0.482*              -0.617              -0.208       
                         (0.740)             (0.272)              (0.412)             (0.254)       
                                                                                                   
CORR                     -0.076               0.085               -0.099              -0.116       
                         (0.326)             (0.159)              (0.236)             (0.148)       
                                                                                                   
COST                     -0.046               0.026                0.018              -0.021 
                         (0.029)             (0.016)              (0.041)             (0.020) 
                                                                                                   
Constant                 -15.438             29.242**              34.386              13.224      
                         (34.420)            (13.913)             (21.083)            (12.967)       
                                                                                                   
 
Observations                62                  68                  68                  70         
R2                        0.599               0.863                0.680              0.820        
Adjusted R2               0.301               0.765                0.449              0.697        
Residual Std.Error  0.315 (df = 35)     0.145 (df = 39)      0.220 (df = 39)    0.142 (df = 41)   
F Statistic       2.008** (df=26;35)  8.790*** (df=28;39)  2.953*** (df=28;39) 6.673*** (df=28;41) 
 
Note:                                                             *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Predicted score change for all services 
We used Model 2 to predict the average score change among the cities of regional 
significance. These graphs are presented in Appendix A. Based on the graphs, we can divide 
the services into those that experience steady improvements in quality and those that stagnate 
after making initial improvements. The first group includes services such as road 
infrastructure, public parks and gardens, medical institutions, public transportations, and 
utilities. These services experienced stable increases in quality over the measured periods and 
would, potentially, see the increases in the future. We should note that the change in the 
quality of medical institutions has the slowest pace among all measured services As we 
discussed earlier, the Ukrainian government is expecting rapid improvement to medical 
institutions by 2020. Based on the results, we can speculate that improvements in the quality 
of medical institutions need more time to take place and for the changes to be recognized by 
the citizens.  
The second group of services, including education, sport facilities, and cultural 
venues, experienced rapid increase of the quality in the period from 2016 to 2017, but the 
quality remained stable or slightly increased in the following year. This may indicate that the 
additional budgeting of the services that started in 2014-2015 provided quick results in a 
short period but slowed down later when looking look at the long-term effects. This trend 
indicates that this group of services needs special attention by policy makers and local 
officials, and should be monitored for results. Identifying and addressing the reasons for 
stagnating quality will ensure that the services continue to improve. An evaluation of the 
causes should include an analysis of the local administration as well as the views and 




As already indicated, this study has some limitations related to data availablility.  
Other limitations are related to the methodology of collecting observations of the dependent 
variable - the quality of the local services in major cities in Ukraine. The dependent variable 
was measured using a survey, which collects subjective opinions of the respondents. The 
Ukrainian Municipal Survey assess the quality of public services and its change over time. 
However, as Van de Walle, (2018, p.229) points out “subjective assessments, such as 
satisfaction, of a public service, do not necessarily reflect objective features or performance 
of that service, and satisfaction ratings are influenced by factors other than service quality”. 
In other words, higher satisfaction with a service does not necessarily reflect an increase in 
service quality. 
However, this was the best usable data available. Thus, the analysis assumed that the 
quality of services did, in fact, change over time, and that it was changing in the same 
settings (the same geographical areas and affected by the same external influences). 
Therefore, the same person asked for her subjective opinion about the quality of local public 
services at a different time can clearly evaluate whether the change occurs. To reduce bias in 
studies of quality based on the public evaluations, future researchers may incorporate 
previous expectations and opinions to assess how these may impact later satisfaction. Using 
this approach, a study can address whether satisfactions or dissatisfaction with a service is 
connected to any objective measure of quality or as a result of other external influence that 
may be controlled. Considering respondent’s behavior, future researchers can also assess 
whether the opinion about a particular service influences thier attitudes towards the 
government system as a whole (Van de Walle, 2018), quite possibly the case in Ukraine, 
where corruption in government still remains high. 
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Another limitation relates to the dependent variable and the use of a Liker-type 
questions. When answering Likert-type questions, respondents tend to avoid "extremes", 
choices like ‘excellent' or ‘terrible'. This tendency in survey respondants causes the central 
choices to be selected more frequently and the results to anchor around the central choice, 
greatly eliminating the possibility of a variable to gain the maximum or minimum score even 
though that might be the precise representation of reality (Bishop & Herron, 2015).  
Additionally, in this study, the measure of ethnic fractionalization creates some 
limitations as well. Ethnic fractionalization accounts for the probability of choosing two 
persons that belong to two different ethnic groups from a population, but it does not account 
for the total (n) number of the ethnic groups, nor does it account for the extremity of the 
differences between those groups. Differences like religion, language, culture, and 
ultimately, political differences, often have different effects on local governments. Also, the 
index does not account for ethnicity itself and does not show whether a region has more 
ethnic Ukrainians or ethnic Russians. For example, the Eastern oblasts of Ukraine have high 
ethnic fractionalization indexes because the proportions between ethnic Ukrainians and 
ethnic Russian are close to half. At the same time, Zakarpatska oblast has a relatively high 
index as well, but this measure is due to a larger number of ethnic groups, each of which has 
a small weight in the total population. In this situation, both geographic areas have a similar 
looking ethnic fractionalization index, but it is obvious that the oblasts are very different in 
terms of ethnic composition, and therefore different in culture and politics. For future 
research different more sophisticated methods of measuring diversity, such as proposed by 
Arkadiev (2010) can be used, if enough data is available. 
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CHAPTER 5.    SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
In this study, we analyzed the effects of the decentralization reform, that started in 
Ukraine in 2014, on the quality of public services provided on a local level. Before the 
decentralization, local governments in Ukraine were dependent on transfers from the central 
government to maintain the quality of local services and infrastructure. Due to the inability of 
the central government to account for specific local needs and allocate sufficient funds to 
fulfill these needs, the quality of local services and infrastructure were low. Decentralization 
of governance is expected to solve this budgetary problem and improve the quality of 
services and infrastructure. Regardless of the complications faced by the reform due to the 
military conflict and adoption of legislation including the Amendments to the Constitution, 
positive results of the decentralization reform on the quality of local public services can be 
seen already. As we observe in the study, since the beginning of the decentralization reform, 
the average quality of goods and services increased among the cities participated in the 
Ukrainian Municipal Survey. Only the quality of medical institutions was indicated by the 
respondents as slightly decreased. The most substantial improvements are seen in the quality 
of the road infrastructure and public parks and gardens. 
Based on the results of the study, we accept Hypothesis 1: decentralization leads to 
an improvement in the quality of local public services. However, we recognize that with the 
average improvement in the quality of services, a quarter of the surveyed cities experienced a 




Overall the quality of the goods and services in cities of regional significance that 
were surveyed has improved since the beginning of the decentralization reform. The quality 
of public services experienced an increase of 5.2% in 2018 compared to the quality in 2015. 
The quality of utilities also increased by 4.34% over the period from 2015 to 2018.   
While the average quality of all services among the surveyed cities increased, some 
communities experienced a decline in the quality of local public services. Six individual 
cities, Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, Kherson, Lviv, Severodonetsk, and Ternopil, experienced a 
decline in the quality of all public services and four cities, Chernivtsi, Lviv, Cherkasy, and 
Poltava, faced a decline in the quality of all utilities provided. Overall, the city of Chernivtsi 
(the only city that experienced a decrease of each public and utility service) showed the most 
negative results with the decrease of the overall quality of services by 9.1% and quality of 
utilities by 12.1%. One possible explanation for this pattern is the increased level of 
corruption in 2017 compared to the level of 2015 in Chernivtsi (see Appendix B, Figure B.1). 
However, in another city that experienced a similar increase in corruption, Zhytomyr, the 
quality of each service still improved. This contradictory finding suggests that the level of 
corruption may not be a good predictor of service quality. 
A close look at the case of the city of Chernivtsi showed a plausible cause of the 
city’s poor development – low level of democracy and an inability of elected officials to find 
common ground. The reasons for these disagreements are the confrontation of political clans 
and the power of oligarchs in the area. Therefore, the city council has been ineffective in 
decision-making regarding infrastructure development (improvement of road infrastructure) 
and improvements in the quality of public services such as water supply and public 
transportation. Resignation of the mayor by the city council members did not add to the 
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public welfare. “In less than ten years, [Chernivtsi] is left without a head for the second time. 
And the second time - not by the will of the voters, but through the confrontation of political 
clans” – a local news article (Gavriluk, 2018). In 2015 the local constituency gave more than 
50% of votes to Mr. Kaspruk, who became the mayor of the city. In 2018 the members of the 
city council voted for him to resign. As another article claims, fewer people voted for the 29 
council members that supported the resignation than voted for the mayor (Churylova, 2018). 
In 2019 Mr. Kaspruk was renewed in his position by a court decision. However, even after 
the return of the legitimate mayor the political confrontations in the city remain in place 
negatively affecting the quality of life for the citizens.  
As we know from the literature, when decentralization occurs without simultaneous 
democratization it does not provide successful results. This seems to be the case in 
Chernivtsi. Even though the citizens of Chernivtsi are politically decentralized and are able to 
use their rights to vote for a mayor and city council members, the confrontation of political 
clans impedes the implementation of this democratic mechanism. Elected by the majority, the 
mayor was not able to perform his duties due to the political conflict, reducing the effect of 
the citizens’ democratic participation. 
Based on the fact that the highest increase in the quality we see in the quality of road 
infrastructure and public parks and gardens, we accept Hypothesis 2: decentralization of 
democratic governments leads to a greater focus on public services that can demonstrate 
immediate improvements than those that need more impact. The results of this study support 
Berney (2011) findings that described public spaces as easy and cheap development that  
local governments can implement while producing visible results. 95% of the surveyed cities 
improved the quality of road infrastructure by 16.7% on average, which resulted in an 
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increase in the average score from 2.46 to 2.85 on the 5-level scale. 79% of the cities from 
the poll enhanced their public spaces by improving public parks. The quality of road 
infrastructure and public parks can also be described as easy, cheap, and fast improvement. 
The improvements might work towards uniting communities together and increasing their 
identification as a part of a community. Indirectly, the improvements of the public spaces 
might increase public participation in the planning process if each citizen develops feelings 
of significance in being a part of a city and having a voice and responsibility of the future 
community development. 
We found no evidence to support Hypotheses 3 that larger communities are more 
likely to have a higher quality of public services due to economies of scale than smaller 
communities. We should mention that the size of the communities considered in our study is 
sufficient to provide economies of scale for the provision of public services. However, a 
study that includes more heterogeneously sized communities may be more suitable for testing 
the relationship between the quality of services and economies of scale. 
The quality of medical institutions and cultural venues is positively associated with 
ethnic fractionalization, contradictory to our Hypothesis 4, which states that less diverse 
municipalities are more likely to have better public services than more diverse ones. 
Additional research is needed to explain this trend. The results of this study might be biased 
due to limitations connected to the methodology of calculating ethnic fractionalization. 
We found no evidence to support Hypothesis 5, more urbanized municipalities are 
more likely to have better public services. In fact, the results are opposite to the quality of 
medical institutions and cultural venues. A negative relationship between the quality of these 
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two services and the level of urbanization may show that it is easier to provide higher quality 
services in less densely populated areas where the number of people seeking service is lower.   
Recommendations 
Based on the results, we recommend, first, to establish monitoring of the work of the 
local governments. The results reveal a necessity for the central government to monitor the 
work of local governments in terms of expenditures, allocations of budgets, and 
implementations of the goals and objectives related to the improvement in the quality of local 
services. Creation of a commission or other governing body that regulates the rates and 
quality of services will help to monitor those services. Ukrainian government can use Utility 
Regulatory Commissions or Public Service Commissions that operate in the United States as 
an example of such commissions. The monitoring also should ensure that the local 
governments concentrate not only on the policies and actions that produce visible 
improvements in short periods of time, such as road infrastructure and public parks, but also 
on services that require longer time periods and greater financing for improvement.  
Secondly, there is a need to consciously work toward an increase in public 
participation in decision-making. Trust building between the local governments and citizens 
might help to increase the participation and engagement of the community in local 
governance. Also, increased engagement will make it easier for local governments to be 
aware of the needs of the population.  
The central government should also continue to provide training for local officials. As 
we mentioned previously, the lack of experience in comprehensive planning and economic 
development planning for communities results in the low efficiency of the local 
governments. Through the introduction of specific training, workshops, or experience 
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exchange central government can facilitate future improvements in the quality of local public 
services. 
Our main recommendation for local governments in Ukraine will be to separate 
responsibilities between public and private service providers. Shifting the responsibility of 
providing public services from local governments to private companies will ensure more 
consumer oriented services, and therefore, higher quality of services due to market 
competition. Services that cannot be privatized and should remain public, such as medical 
services, education, roads, and public parks, will get more attention from the local 
governments if other services are privatized; for example, trash collection, water supply, 
sewer, some means of public transportation, and some sport and cultural venues. As the study 
by Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, & Prado-Lorenzo (2012) shows, public companies 
are better in providing public transportation, health care, and trade services while outsourced 
private companies provide better quality for water services and waste collection. Without this 
separation, the provision of services would probably decline. As we can observe in the city of 
Chernivtsi, due to the political conflicts in the city council, the local government could not 
effectively operate and make decisions about the infrastructure development and 
improvements in the quality of public services. If services like water supply or public 
transportation were less reliant on the local government, we would probably see positive 
changes in the city of Chernivtsi and even better results in the rest of the surveyed cities. 
Another way to improve the quality of public services is to involve the public in the 
process. Working groups that should include representatives from the local administrations, 
private services suppliers, local NGOs, and active citizens may work on the improvements 
and development of a particular service. Through the development of maps, inventories, 
66 
 
identification of weaknesses, and monitoring processes working groups can establish specific 
plans for improvements.  
The modernization of public services could also be aided by the implementation of 
public-private partnerships. During large-scale infrastructure projects like the replacement of 
water pipes in a city, local governments face issues with cost, funding, and challenges in 
management. Through the public-private partnerships local governments can reduce the 
dependence of a project only on the government and share funding and management 
responsibilities with private companies and suppliers, rather than develop independently. 
Besides the proposed recommendations, we stress the importance of good governance 
in reaching goals for improvements in the quality of public services. Low levels of 
corruption, good management of budget and resources, and a strong commitment from 
government representatives will always be crucial to the achievement of positive results.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we assessed the effects of government decentralization on the quality of 
public services in major cities in Ukraine, where the decentralization reform has been 
underway since 2014. The results show that on average the quality of public services in 
Ukrainian cities of regional significance increased over the period 2015-2018. Among all 
analyzed services, the quality of road infrastructure and public parks and gardens increased 
the most substantially. In addition, lesser increases are observed in the quality of education, 
sport facilities, cultural venues, public transportation, and utilities. Only the quality of 
medical institutions slightly decreased on average among all the surveyed cities.  
In one of the cities measured, Chernivtsi, the quality of all services decreased, 
possibly due to political conflicts in the city council, a unique political environment among 
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the others. The local government in Chernivtsi could not effectively operate, setting the city 
apart from the others in our study, in services offered and in its appearance to its citizens, and 
negatively affecting the measure of the quality of public services.  
Due to the unavailability of data for each municipality in Ukraine, this study is 
limited to cities of regional significance. Additional studies could benefit from more data if it 
becomes available. More data would allow researchers to assess changes in the quality of 
services in municipalities with a population smaller than 50,000 people. Additionally, if more 
data were available it would be beneficial to carry out a similar study over a longer period of 
time. For this study, we used data for 4 years, which may be an insufficient period to reflect 
substantial changes in the quality of services.  
Moreover, future studies that seek to measure the quality of public services ought to 
address the limitations of this study where possible. As we mentioned, more advanced 
methods of measuring the quality of services like SERVQUAL can give more reliable 
results. In addition, methods that account for the number of ethnic minorities, and their 
percentages in the total population, to measure the level of ethnic fragmentation could be of a 
greater explanatory value for future research. The researcher could also explore different 
measures for the level of corruption. Some measures may be considered more valid than 
others. For example, instead of using the citizens’ perspective on the change in the level of 
corruption, corruption could be measured using indicators that directly reflect local 
government transparency, efficiency, and responsiveness. A measure of this kind would 
eliminate some of the unreliability of survey responses. 
Based on the results observed in the study, we have several recommendations. First, 
we would like to stress the necessity for restructuring the way services are operated in most 
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of Ukraine. This ought to come in the form of privatization of some public services and 
offering public-private partnerships and subcontracts. Secondly, we recommend establishing 
a monitoring process that will allow assessing the work of local governments in terms of 
expenditures, allocations of budgets, and implementations of the goals and objectives related 
to the improvement of governance and in the quality of local service, in particular. 
Additionally, an increase in the citizens’ participation in the decision-making process will 
help local governments to reflect on the needs of the population.  
These recommendations are our best attempt to provide a prescriptive action for the 
government of Ukraine and the decentralization reform. Complete decentralization of the 
government will undoubtedly take a longer time than the five years that have passed since the 
reform’s start.  The communities of Ukraine would do well to observe the events that have 
unfolded in Chernivtsi and try to avoid the same outcomes. The citizens of those 




Akin, J., Hutchinson, P., & Strumpf, K. (2005). Decentralisation and government provision 
of public goods: The public health sector in Uganda. The Journal of Development 
Studies, 41(8), 1417–1443. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380500187075 
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterley, W. (1999). Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1243–1284. 
Allers, M. A., & Geertsema, J. B. (2014). The effects of local government amalgamation on 
public spending and service levels: Evidence from 15 years of municipal boundary 
reform (Vol. 14019-EEF). Groningen: University of Groningen, SOM Research 
School. 
Antón, J.-I., Muñoz de Bustillo, R., Fernández Macías, E., & Rivera, J. (2014). Effects of 
health care decentralization in Spain from a citizens’ perspective. The European 
Journal of Health Economics, 15(4), 411–431. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-013-
0485-0 
Arkadiev, D. (2010). Measuring Of Ethnic Homogeneity Of The Population–One New 
Approach. Scientific Annals of the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi: 
Economic Sciences Series, 57, 421–437. 
Barnett, C. C., Minis, H. P., & VanSant, J. (1997). Democratic decentralization. Research 
Triangle Institute, 20. 
Berney, R. (2011). Pedagogical Urbanism: Creating Citizen Space in Bogota, Colombia. 
Planning Theory, 10(1), 16–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095210386069 
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public 
goods: A political economy approach. Journal of Public Economics, 87(12), 2611–
2637. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00141-X 
Bilouseac, I. A. (2015). Specific Elements of Administrative Decentralization. European 
Journal of Law and Public Administration, 2, 5–14. 
Bish, R. L. (2001). Local government amalgamations: Discredited nineteenth century ideals 
alive in the twenty first. Commentary - C.D. Howe Institute, (150), 1. 
Bishop, P. A., & Herron, R. L. (2015). Use and Misuse of the Likert Item Responses and 
Other Ordinal Measures. International Journal of Exercise Science, 8(3), 297–302. 
Blom-Hansen, J. (2010). Municipal Amalgamations and Common Pool Problems: The 





Brancati, D. (2006). Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic 
Conflict and Secessionism? International Organization, 60(03). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830606019X 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing 
and Communal Services of Ukraine. (2017). Fiscal decentralization in Ukraine: First 
successes. Retrieved from 
https://decentralization.gov.ua/uploads/attachment/document/17/Fiscal_Decentralisati
on_in_Ukraine_First_Successes_En.pdf 
Cavalieri, M., & Ferrante, L. (2016). Does fiscal decentralization improve health outcomes? 
Evidence from infant mortality in Italy. Social Science & Medicine, 164, 74–88. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.07.017 
Chen, L., Huang, J., & Li, J. (2017). Fiscal Decentralization, Satisfaction with Social 
Services, and Inequality Under the Hukou System. Social Indicators Research, 
132(1), 377–394. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1258-9 
Churylova, K. (2018, August 15). Міський голова Чернівців оскаржив у суді своє 
усунення з посади - zaxid.net. Retrieved July 7, 2019, from zaxid.net website: 
https://zaxid.net/miskiy_golova_chernivtsiv_oskarzhiv_u_sudi_svoye_usunennya_z_
posadi_n1463553 
Cordeiro Guerra, S., & Lastra-Anadón, C. X. (2019). The quality-access tradeoff in 
decentralizing public services: Evidence from education in the OECD and Spain. 
Journal of Comparative Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2018.12.004 
Crawford, G., & Hartmann, C. (2008). Decentralisation in Africa: A pathway out of poverty 
and conflict? Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.doabooks.org/doab?func=fulltext&rid=12765 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., García-Sánchez, I.-M., & Prado-Lorenzo, J.-M. (2012). Effects of 
different modes of local public services delivery on quality of life in Spain. Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 37, 68–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.06.008 
Diaz-Serrano, L., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2012). Decentralization, Subjective Well-Being, 
and the Perception of Institutions: Decentralization, Subjective Well-Being and the 
Perception. Kyklos, 65(2), 179–193. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6435.2012.00533.x 
Faguet, J.-P. (2004). Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local 
needs? Evidence from Bolivia. Journal of Public Economics, 88(3–4), 867–893. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00185-8 





Faguet, J.-P., & Sánchez, F. (2008). Decentralization’s Effects on Educational Outcomes in 
Bolivia and Colombia. World Development, 36(7), 1294–1316. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.06.021 
Faguet, J.-P., & Sánchez, F. (2014). Decentralization and access to social services in 
Colombia. Public Choice, 160(1–2), 227–249. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-
0077-7 
Freinkman, L. (2010). Fiscal Decentralization and the Quality of Public Services in Russian 
Regions. Public Finance and Management; Harrisburg, 10(1), 117–168. 
Full text of the Minsk agreement. (2015, February 12). Retrieved February 28, 2019, from 
Financial Times website: https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-
00144feab7de 
Galiani, S., Gertler, P., & Schargrodsky, E. (2008). School decentralization: Helping the 
good get better, but leaving the poor behind. Journal of Public Economics, 92(10–
11), 2106–2120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.004 
Gavriluk, K. (2018, August 3). Фірташ vs. Яценюк. Чому знову скинули мера в 
Чернівцях. Firtash vs. Yatsenyuk Why again the mayor was thrown in Chernivtsi. 
Українська правда. Retrieved from 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/08/3/7188150/ 
Goel, R. K., Mazhar, U., Nelson, M. A., & Ram, R. (2017). Different forms of 
decentralization and their impact on government performance: Micro-level evidence 
from 113 countries. Economic Modelling, 62, 171–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.12.010 
Hanes, N., & Wikström, M. (2008). Does the Local Government Structure Affect Population 
and Income Growth? An Empirical Analysis of the 1952 Municipal Reform in 
Sweden. Regional Studies, 42(4), 593–604. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400701281311 
Hanes, N., & Wikström, M. (2010). Amalgamation Impacts on Local Growth: Are Voluntary 
Municipal Amalgamations More Efficient than Compulsory Amalgamations? 
Canadian Journal of Regional Science, 33(1), 57–70. 
Homenko, S. (2016, August 31). Річниця вибухів 31 серпня: Що ми знаємо? Retrieved 
February 18, 2019, from BBC News Ukraine website: 
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2016/08/160831_31aug_anniversary_sx 
Hutcheson, D. S., & Korosteleva, E. A. (2006). Patterns of Participation in Post-Soviet 
Politics. Comparative European Politics; London, 4(1), 23–46. 
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.iastate.edu/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110068 
International Alert/Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. (2017). 
Decentralization in Ukraine. Achievements, expectations and concers. 
72 
 
Jiménez-Rubio, D. (2011). The impact of fiscal decentralization on infant mortality rates: 
Evidence from OECD countries. Social Science & Medicine, 73(9), 1401–1407. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.07.029 
Jiménez-Rubio, D., & García-Gómez, P. (2017). Decentralization of health care systems and 
health outcomes: Evidence from a natural experiment. Social Science & Medicine, 
188, 69–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.06.041 
Khaleghian, P. (2004). Decentralization and public services: The case of immunization. 
Social Science & Medicine, 59(1), 163–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2003.10.013 
Kudamatsu, M. (2012). Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa? Evidence From Micro Data. Journal of the European Economic Association, 
10(6), 1294–1317. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01092.x 
Kwon, O. (2012). Fiscal Decentralization: An Effective Tool For Government Reform?: 
Fiscal Decentralization. Public Administration, 544–560. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.01982.x 
Levitas, T., & Djikic, J. (2017). Caught Mid-Stream: “Decentralization,” Local Government 
Finance Reform, and the Restructuring of Ukraine’s Public Sector 2014 to 2016. 
Swedish Association of Local and Regional Authorities , Swedish International 
Development Agency. 
Manor, J. (1999). The political economy of democratic decentralization. In Directions in 
Development. Washington, D.C: World Bank. 
Mewes, K. (2011). Decentralization Concept. In K. Mewes (Ed.), Decentralization on the 
Example of the Yemeni Water Sector (pp. 29–52). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-
93051-0_3 
Ministry of Regional Development, Building and Housing and Communal Services of 
Ukraine. (2019). Monitoring the Process of Decentralization of The Power and 
Reform of Local Government. Kiev 
Nelson, M. A. (1992). Municipal amalgamation and the growth of the local public sector in 
Sweden. Journal of Regional Science, 32(1), 39–53. 
Oates, W. E. (1985). Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study. The American Economic 
Review, 75(4), 748–757. 
Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature; 
Nashville, 37(3), 1120–1149. 
Palchuk, V. (2018). Спрощення процедури добровільного приєднання територіальних 
громад сіл, селищ до міст обласного значення. Україна: Події, Факти,  
Коментарі, 12, 34–45. 
73 
 
Rabinovych, M., Levitas, A., & Umland, A. (2018). Revisiting Decentralization After 
Maidan: Achievements and Challenges of Ukraine’s Local Governance Reform. 
Kennan Cable, 34. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-
cable-no-34-revisiting-decentralization-after-maidan-achievements-and-challenges 
Reingewertz, Y. (2012). Do municipal amalgamations work? Evidence from municipalities 
in Israel. Journal of Urban Economics, 72(2–3), 240–251. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.06.001 
Sanogo, T. (2019). Does fiscal decentralization enhance citizens’ access to public services 
and reduce poverty? Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire municipalities in a conflict setting. 
World Development, 113, 204–221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.09.008 
Siddle, A. M., & Koelble, T. A. (2012). The failure of decentralisation in South African local 
government: Complexity and unanticipated consequences. Cape Town, South Africa: 
UCT Press. 
Slack, E., & Bird, R. M. (2013). Does municipal amalgamation strengthen the financial 
viability of local government? A Canadian example. Public Finance and 
Management, 13(2), 99–123. 
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. (2001). All-Ukrainian population census. National 
composition of population. Retrieved from 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/ 
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. (2016). Regional Statistics. GRP per capita. Retrieved 
from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2008/vvp/vrp/vrp2017_u.xls 
Tavares, A. F. (2018). Municipal amalgamations and their effects: A literature review. 
Miscellanea Geographica, 22(1), 5–15. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2018-0005 
The Verhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2015). Адміністративно - територіальний устрій 
України. Retrieved from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130313062541/http://static.rada.gov.ua/zakon/new/NE
WSAIT/ADM/d01.rtf 




Van de Walle, S. (2018). Explaining Citizen Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with Public 
Services. In E. Ongaro & S. Van Thiel (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Public 





Wahiu, W., Hedling, N., & Böckenförde, M. (Eds.). (2011). A practical guide to constitution 
building. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. 
Wallis, J. J., & Oates, W. E. (1988). Decentralization in the Public Sector: An Empirical 
Study of State and Local Government. Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies, 5–32. 
Yesmukhanova, Y. (2018). Nations in transit: confronting liberalism. Ukraine. Country 
report. Retrieved from Freedom House website: 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NiT2018_Ukraine.pdf 
Yusoff, M. A., Sarjoon, A., & Hassan, M. A. (2016). Decentralization as a Tool for Ethnic 
Diversity Accommodation: A Conceptual Analysis. Journal of Politics and Law, 
9(1), 55. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n1p55 
Фінансова децентралізація: експерти розповіли про результати 2018 року та 
перспективи 2019. (2019). Retrieved April 2, 2019, from 
https://decentralization.gov.ua/news/10670 
Якщо особливості місцевого самоврядування дадуть можливість реінтегрувати 
Донбас, то чому цього не може бути в Конституції України? – Володимир 





APPENDIX A. PREDICTED SCORES 
  

















2015 2016 2017 2018














2015 2016 2017 2018























2015 2016 2017 2018













2015 2016 2017 2018




































2015 2016 2017 2018























2015 2016 2017 2018























APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 




























Cost of trash 
removal 
Cost of water 
supply 
Cost of sewer 
Cherkasy 13.08 49.49 28.190 56.772 1.39 11.021 6.090 5.248 
Chernihiv 12.36 44.04 29.247 64.656 1.12 7.493 9.029 8.189 
Chernivtsi 40.65 25.07 26.560 43.020 1.11 9.480 7.863 4.251 
Dnipro 33.84 79.48 98.766 83.660 1.45 12.385 6.409 4.569 
Ivano-Frankivsk 4.86 38.90 23.205 43.793 1.22 14.796 5.008 6.900 
Kharkiv 43.25 57.49 144.809 80.694 1.15 13.575 7.857 4.278 
Kherson 30.62 37.45 29.403 61.230 1.18 15.563 6.711 6.551 
Khmelnytsky 11.67 39.82 26.845 56.438 1.17 8.088 6.745 6.830 
Kirovograd 18.15 47.34 23.042 62.879 1.29 7.988 8.685 7.864 
Kyiv 14.02 74.78 291.371 62.725 1.60 23.895 7.111 6.276 
Lutsk 5.95 40.55 21.702 52.298 1.30 12.570 5.560 5.524 
Lviv 9.94 48.35 72.813 60.960 1.44 22.333 5.910 3.910 
Mykolaiv 30.77 50.77 49.134 68.258 1.45 19.060 7.635 5.785 
Odesa 53.55 59.75 101.241 66.879 1.47 18.510 7.722 6.352 
Poltava 15.99 72.58 29.262 62.008 1.45 10.065 7.760 6.385 
Rivne 7.94 37.72 24.797 47.574 1.33 11.863 7.664 5.989 
Sumy 20.18 39.37 26.658 68.661 1.52 8.035 5.199 4.710 
Ternopil 4.33 35.04 21.813 44.676 1.42 7.800 4.681 6.309 
Uzhgorod 32.22 30.11 11.467 37.041 1.51 14.074 10.670 5.820 
Vinnytsa 9.76 42.66 37.258 50.867 1.30 12.026 6.018 4.059 
Zaporizha 43.55 61.88 75.376 77.204 1.67 10.663 6.438 4.258 
Zhytomyr 17.94 39.65 26.796 58.865 1.38 9.133 4.918 6.275 
Mariupol 52.81 32.86 47.219 90.735 0.98 10.708 10.113 4.812 
Severodonetsk 51.08 12.97 11.678 86.904 1.19 10.315 5.849 6.167 
min 4.33 12.97 11.47 37.04 0.98 7.49 4.68 3.91 
max 53.55 79.48 291.37 90.73 1.67 23.90 10.67 8.19 
median 18.04 41.60 28.72 61.62 1.35 11.44 6.73 5.90 
average 24.10 45.76 53.28 62.03 1.34 12.56 6.99 5.72 
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